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Abstract 
Poor quality financial statement audits have a negative impact on the information 
provided to principals and stakeholders that can increase the risk of corporate fraud.  The 
well-documented collapses of companies, such as Enron and WorldCom, brought the 
issue of audit quality to the headlines. Using agency theory as the conceptual framework, 
the purpose of this single case study was to determine what strategies client managers and 
boards can use to facilitate an engagement with an audit firm and effectively carry out 
their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence and support for their 
management assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  The population comprised a 
census sample of 9 individuals with direct involvement in the audit process within a 
Connecticut-based organization and its audit firm. Data collection comprised of 
semistructured interviews and analysis of public and internal documents.  Using 
methodological triangulation, 5 primary themes emerged including communication, 
documentation, knowledge and experience, character, and procedural.  The findings of 
this study may promote social change by enhancing knowledge of what role management 
can play in ensuring a high-quality audit.  Improved insight to the audit process may 
promote investor confidence in the financial statements and economic growth through 
capital spending. 
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study  
Subsequent to the collapse of companies such as Enron and WorldCom, business 
officials, regulatory agencies, and investors realized that shortfalls exist in the financial 
statement audit process (Kao, Li, & Zhang, 2013).  The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOX), sponsored by U.S. Senator  Sarbanes (D-MD)  and U.S. 
Representative l Oxley (R-OH), to deter future corporate governance scandals was a 
direct response to these high profile collapses (Willits & Nicholls, 2014).  The Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) officials wrote SOX to focus on financial reporting 
quality, including reporting, disclosure, and internal controls over financial reporting 
(Gupta, Weirich, & Turner, 2013).  The Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2003) 
established that audits must conform with generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), 
assuring the financial statements are in conformance with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) and free of material misstatements.  The audit standards promulgated 
by both the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and the Audit 
Standards Board (ASB) detail specific responsibilities over financial reporting for both 
the auditor and management (PCAOB, 2015). The purpose of this qualitative exploratory 
case study was to determine what strategies client managers and boards can use to 
facilitate an engagement with an audit firm to carry out their responsibility to provide 
effective relevant evidence and support for their management assertions as outlined in the 
audit engagement letter. 
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Background of the Problem 
Financial statement audits conducted by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) are 
the primary safeguard shareholders have to ensure companies are presenting financial 
information that is free of material mistakes and in accordance with GAAP (Skinner & 
Srinivasan, 2012). An audit is an objective evaluation a company’s internal controls, 
transactions, account balances, and financial statement presentation by independent 
experts (Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, & Velury, 2013). While the auditor is 
responsible for expressing an opinion on the fair presentation of the financial statements, 
management is responsible for these statements (PCAOB, 2015). In published auditing 
standards, the PCAOB outlines responsibilities for the board of directors and 
management related to the annual financial statement audit including:  
• Designating an individual with the skills, knowledge, and experience to be 
responsible for overseeing the audit services;  
• (b) Preparation the financial statements;  
• (c) Reviewing and overseeing adjusting entries and correcting entries, 
including understanding the impact these entries have on the financial 
statement (American Institute of Public Accountants [AICPA], 2015).  
Boone, Khurana, and Raman (2012) indicated that audit process inputs, such as (a) 
partner rotation, (b) audit firm rotation, (c) auditor independence, (d) regulatory changes, 
(e) comingling non-audit services during the course of an engagement, and (f) auditor and 
client relationship affect the quality of an audit.  Thus, the board of directors and 
management is responsible for identifying a quality firm and establishing the terms of 
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engagement that meets the best interests of the stakeholders.  Ensuring a quality audit 
engagement protects the company stakeholders from financial statement fraud, material 
misstatement, and penalties and litigation claims against the company (Ojo, 2014).  
Problem Statement 
Restating financial statements to correct material errors burdens management 
because of the impact on credit ratings (Liu, Rowe, & Wang, 2012), increased risk of 
litigation, and loss of confidence in management (Mande & Myungsoo, 2013).  Liu et al 
(2012) determined that a company’s credit rating decreased by 58% of a credit rating 
level designation on the Standard and Poor’s rating system after a financial restatement.  
The general business problem is that companies have credit rating risk with materially 
misstated financial statements.  The specific business problem is that some client 
managers and boards lack strategies to facilitate an engagement with an audit firm and 
effectively carry out their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence and 
support for their manager assertions. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to determine what 
strategies client managers and boards can use to facilitate an engagement with an audit 
firm and effectively carry out their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence 
and support for their management assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  The 
population included nine individuals that make up the audit team who are involved in the 
annual financial statement audit for a Connecticut-based public company.  Data 
collection included open-ended interviews and public data available on the company. The 
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implication for positive social change includes the potential to have a better insight to 
audit processes.  Improved insight to the audit process may promote investor confidence 
in the financial statements and economic growth through capital spending.  
Nature of the Study 
The chosen method for this study was qualitative.  My research goal was to 
identify thematic issues, which surface during the literature review and research phase of 
a study.  Qualitative methodology is appropriate when the researcher wants to explore 
themes, primarily through interviews with participants (Barnham, 2012).  Quantitative 
researchers seek to determine the significance of a relationship between reduced variables 
(Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013).  However, the purpose of this study was to identify 
themes not to measure the significance of relationships between variables. A quantitative 
research approach was not appropriate when variables are not predefined (Fassinger & 
Morrow, 2013).  A mixed method study was also not ideal because, as indicated by 
Fassinger and Morrow, the quantitative portion of a mixed method study would require 
the prediction and testing of the theoretical construct. 
The design for this research was a case study.  A case study has a singular setting 
or targeted focus (Løkke & Sørensen, 2014).  A case study was appropriate for this study 
because the design allows me to conduct an in-depth exploration of multiple data sources 
from my chosen research area (Yin, 2014).  A phenomenological study, investigating the 
lived experiences of the participants, involving several sites would require lengthy 
interviews to evaluate the detailed topics this study covered, reducing the participants’ 
willingness to partake in the study (Small, 2009).  Additionally, a phenomenological 
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design was not suitable for this study because understanding the lived experiences of 
participants was not the main purpose of this study.  An ethnographic study was 
inappropriate because the study was addressing a business problem that exists worldwide 
and was not limited to one ethnicity or culture (Small, 2009). 
Research Question 
The overarching research question was: what strategies can client managers and 
boards use to facilitate an engagement, provide relevant evidence, and support 
management assertions? 
Interview Questions 
1. What interactions exist in the audit process between the client and auditor? 
2. What role does the client play in the audit process?  
3. How does the client’s interaction with the auditor affect audit quality? 
4. What components of the audit process are within the control of the client? 
5. What components of an audit are not within the control of the client? 
6. What measures are appropriate in determining the quality of an audit? 
7. What factors do you believe compromise the quality of the audit process? 
Conceptual Framework 
The primary conceptual framework theory for this topic was agency theory as 
introduced by Berle and Means (1932), expanded by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and 
further expanded by Jensen and Meckling (2009).  The principal assumption of agency 
theory, according to Jensen and Meckling (2009) is that management agents will not act 
in the best interest of owners or shareholders (the principals) without proper oversight to 
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ensure such commitment.  Fama (1980) described a cost associated with monitoring 
agents.  The cost of an audit, which is quite substantial, is an example of agency related 
monitoring cost (Gotti, Han, Higgs, & Kang, 2012).  Agency theory was an appropriate 
framework for the audit process because the purpose of an audit was to validate the fair 
presentation of financial information communicated by the agents to the principals.  If the 
agents could be trusted to act in the best interest of the principals, the reliance on the 
audit by the board or directors, investors, and owners would significantly decrease.  Fama 
(1980) reduced the company framework to a series of contracts between the principal and 
each agent.  Each agent is driven by self-interests, which the contracts attempt to redirect 
to the company’s benefit.  Two of the primary components of agency theory are costs of 
monitoring an agent’s behavior and costs incurred to ensure the agent does not engage in 
opportunistic behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 2009).  The original theory framed the 
relationship between principals and agents, specifically owners and managers, in the 
arena of large public companies (Berle & Means, 1932).  The theory has evolved over the 
past decades by other authors utilizing the term of agent as any party acting on behalf of 
the principals or the company as a whole (Saltaji, 2013).  Agency theory was appropriate 
for this study because the foundation of the study was to determine what client managers 
and boards can control in their interaction with the auditor to affect the quality of the 
financial statement audit.  Additionally, the foundation of the theory deals with the 
requirement to monitor the activities of the agents and report them to the principals. 
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Operational Definitions 
Audit engagement: The audit engagement is the contractual agreement between 
the audit firm and the client defining scope, liability, and fee (Desir, Casterella, & 
Kokina, 2014). 
Audit risk: The audit risk is the potential for the existence of a material 
misstatement in the financial reports which is not detected in the audit process (Ruhnke & 
Schmidt, 2014). 
Big 4: Big 4 is a representation of the collective of the top four audit firms in the 
world service a majority of corporations (Kao et al., 2013). 
Discretionary accrual: A discretionary accrual is a change to a company’s 
reported financial position for earnings management purposes (Asthana & Boone, 2012). 
Engagement Risk: The engagement risk is the potential for a misunderstanding 
between the client and audit firm about the needs or expectations from one another 
(Reinstein, Green, & Beaulieu, 2013). 
Management assertion: Management assertions are statements that can be 
evaluated by testing measurable criteria (Ben-Menachem & Gavious, 2008). 
Material misstatement: A material misstatement is inaccurate or misleading 
information in the financial statements, which individually or in aggregate are important 
enough to cause the financial statements to not be presented fairly in conformance with 
GAAP (GAO, 2003). 
Unqualified opinion: An unqualified opinion indicates that the auditor expresses 
an opinion that the financial statements are not materially misstated (GAO, 2003). 
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Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions are the information the researcher assumes to be true, even though 
such information may be unproven (Kirkwood & Price, 2013).  A limitation is a threat to 
the validity of the study, causing a researcher to provide findings inconsistent with the 
goals of the study or findings that do not address the research question (Aastrup & 
Halldorsson, 2003).  Delimitations define the boundaries of the study, articulating what 
the researcher will not do or include in the research (Ellis & Levy, 2009).  
Assumptions 
Assumptions are the concepts the researcher believes to be true without empirical 
evidence (Ellis & Levy, 2009).  The first assumption was that financial statements free of 
material misstatements are the responsibility of management and are an expectation of 
external users. I also assumed that participants were knowledgeable of the audit process 
and the company.  My final assumption was that statements made by participants were 
true.  
Limitations 
Limitations are uncontrollable factors inherent in the study that threaten the 
validity of the study (Drost, 2011).  I did not have complete control over who I could 
interview.  The target company provided a participant pool to select as interviewees.  The 
target company and audit firm included in this study limited access to the participation 
pool.  In addition, only those who volunteered participated.  Participants were able to 
withdraw at any time.  Therefore, my final sample population may not represent a 
complete set of information for analysis.  The target company and audit firm included in 
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this study limited access to the participation pool.  As suggested by Ellis and Levy 
(2009), participants may not be experts in the research topic.  Thus, participant comments 
may not reflect industry best practices. 
An additional limitation related to the documentation I reviewed as part of my 
methodological triangulation data collection strategy.  The data available related to the 
historic information of the company.  Historic data does may not represent the current 
situation of the firm. The final limitation relates to a potential for researcher bias in the 
analysis of the interview responses.  A researcher’s knowledge of the problem causes the 
study to be subject to bias (Yin, 2014). 
Delimitations 
Delimitations define the scope of what the researcher will and will not do or 
consider in the study (Ellis & Levy, 2009).  The delimitations articulate the boundaries of 
the study providing context to the research (Ellis & Levy, 2009).  The delimitation of this 
study was the sole company that was studied.  Transferability of the findings from this 
study to other companies would require a similar study.  The findings of this study are 
not indicative of the geographic region or industry in which the company operates. 
The target company of this study was not an SEC registrant and not required to be 
SOX compliant.  Transferability to companies with different circumstances may not be 
appropriate (Yilmaz, 2013).  SOX regulations require companies to disclose more 
detailed information in their filings than other companies.  Therefore, companies who are 
obligated by regulation to be SOX compliant may not be categorically similar to the 
target company of this study.   
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Another delimitation of this study was the company is a Connecticut-based 
company; transferability to other areas of the country or world may not be appropriate. 
Generalizations require large sample sizes to prove the tested theory across many 
variables (Yilmaz, 2013).  Additionally, such generalizations are not typical of qualitative 
research (Yilmaz, 2013). 
Significance of the Study 
A comprehensive audit is essential to many parties because it ensures the 
operations, recordation, and reporting of results by the company are accurate (Ruhnke & 
Schmidt, 2014).  This is important to investors because they are reassured the company is 
conducting business responsibly and faith can be placed in the financial statements.  
Similarly, board members rely on the audit to ensure management is guiding the 
company adequately.  Management relies on the audit to verify that employees are 
following the designated processes and there is no detectable fraud at the operational 
levels.  Employees, like investors and board members, rely on an audit to ensure the 
management team is guiding the company and preparing financial documents 
ethically.  Stakeholders of all levels rely heavily on the audit process, therefore the study 
of the factors that can be detrimental to the audit process and audit quality is of 
significant importance.  
Contribution to Business Practice 
Vendor-customer relationship (Asthana & Boone, 2012) and NAS (Hollingsworth 
& Li, 2012; Paterson & Valencia, 2011) are topics of previous studies on the individual 
concepts of the audit process.  However, I have not found any studies that have 
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incorporated these components with other facets of the audit process that may affect audit 
quality.  If the management team has a better understanding of audit process inputs and 
audit quality, and the factors that affect it, management may mitigate the risk of a low-
quality audit.  Companies, audit firms, and regulatory agencies can develop improved 
standards to ensure higher audit quality with a better understanding of the audit process 
inputs and audit quality. 
Implications for Social Change 
The contribution to professional application is the enhanced knowledge of what 
role management can play in ensuring a high-quality audit.  The successful identification 
of improved standards to ensure higher audit quality will improve stakeholder confidence 
in the financial statements of companies.  This increased confidence can help to ease the 
minds of company shareholders, company employees, and ownership.  Addressing the 
fundamentals of building a quality audit process will help to restore the confidence of the 
public in the way companies are managed, disproving that SOX was implemented too 
quickly and without research (Gupta et al., 2013).  Additionally, the implementation of a 
quality audit process will ensure that collusion between auditors and clients is avoided, 
adding to the confidence of investors and thereby contributing to social change. 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
Many authors have written about individual topics pertaining to the audit process.  
This section will present a summation of the problem, the background theory related to 
the problem, examine the research of previous authors, and present a conclusion of the 
findings.  The literature yielded several topics including (a) auditor independence, (b) 
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auditor size, (c) partner rotation, (d) firm rotation, (e) NAS, (f) fee structure, (g) corporate 
governance, (h) client and customer dynamic, (i) market concentration, (j) opinion 
shopping, (k) SEC, and (l) SOX.  The literature contained herein was located by 
searching the Walden University library for peer-reviewed journal articles pertaining to 
the terms including audit quality, non-audit services, governance, and auditor 
independence.  As I identified new topics in these journals, the aforementioned terms 
emerged and then searched.  Collection of resources ceased when no new topics arose in 
the journal articles.  This literature review includes 124 resources, with 112, or 90%, of 
these resources being peer-reviewed sources.  The publication date of these resources 
ranges from 1988 to 2015, with 112, or 91%, being within 5 years of the publication of 
this study.  In total, the study includes 177 resources, with 153, or 86%, being peer 
reviewed and 154, or 87% being published within 5 years of the publication of this study. 
Background Theories 
The primary background theories pertaining to the audit process are agency 
theory and stewardship theory.  Agency theory and stewardship theory both address the 
relationship between principals and agents, but from opposite perspectives (Htay, 
Salman, & Meera, 2013).  Agency theory views top executives as self-serving, while 
stewardship theory positions the executives as representatives of the stakeholders and 
company vision.  Assuming that the primary objective of an audit is to attest to the 
material accuracy of the financial statements and detecting errors and misstatements, 
agency theory was the appropriate background theory for this study (Kleinman, Lin, & 
Palmon, 2014). 
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Agency theory.  The primary assumption of agency theory is that management 
will not act in the best interest of owners or shareholders without proper oversight to 
ensure such commitment (Saltaji, 2013).  Two of the primary components of the theory 
are costs of monitoring an agent’s behavior and costs incurred to ensure agents do not 
engage in opportunistic behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 2009).  The original theory was 
designed to discuss the relationship between owners and management, with management 
acting as agent for ownership (Berle & Means, 1932).  The theory has evolved over the 
past decades by other authors utilizing the term of agent as any party acting on behalf of 
ownership or the company as a whole (Saltaji, 2013).  Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
argued that components of agency theory, as proposed by prior authors, are valid. 
Specifically, the authors stated that agents will choose paths which are self-serving, but 
state that such actions can also be beneficial to the shareholders.  The authors also 
indicated that incentive mechanisms are typical for promoting management to make 
decisions aligned with the shareholders’ interests.  An example of these mechanisms is a 
plan where the executives receive shares, potentially at a discount, thus aligning the 
executives’ interests with those of the shareholders. More simply, the executives may 
have a compensation package, which is directly tied to the shareholder returns. 
The authors of agency theory argue that sufficient controls enactment and 
monitoring are required to ensure agents do not engage in opportunistic behaviors (Htay 
et al., 2013).  The separation of ownership and control results in conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and executives.  The typical term used for the structuring of the 
controls to safeguard the interests of all parties is corporate governance. 
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Krause and Bruton (2014) pose a fundamental question of agency theory: Who is 
monitoring the controls put in place to safeguard the shareholders’ interests?  This 
includes the question of whether individual board members monitor the controls or 
whether the board acts unitarily. In order to oversee the operations of a company, boards 
require answers to these questions and establish the functions of corporate oversight.  
CEO duality, meaning a CEO who also serves as the chairman of the board of directors, 
is a significant topic in agency theory as well.  Agency theory authors indicate that a 
CEO who is not the board chairman increases independence and oversight (Krause & 
Bruton, 2014).  A CEO serving as both the chief executive and chairman of the board 
would have the power to set his or her own compensation in a favorable way (Jensen & 
Meckling, 2009).  Additionally, it is argued that a CEO with such duality is not 
completely focused on either role, oversight of the company’s operations and leading the 
board, and, therefore, neither role is served sufficiently (Krause & Bruton, 2014). 
Buchanan, Chai, and Deakin (2014) analyzed the differing perspectives of 
managers and shareholders, emphasizing the separation articulated by agency theory 
authors.  Managers participating in Buchanan’s et al. study confirmed they are 
responsible to many stakeholders, not just the shareholders.  The shareholders, of course, 
stated that they should be the primary focus of the managers.  Management also indicated 
the autonomy to determine strategy, demonstrating a deviation from the view that the 
principals should be in charge of the direction and decisions.  Management indicated a 
resistance to cash disbursements to shareholders if such disbursements could hurt the 
firm’s cash flow.  Investors indicated a desire to support the long-term relations of the 
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company, rather than short-term gains of cash payouts.  The managers and shareholder 
agreed that strategic planning should consider the long-term goals of the firm. 
Another concept researchers have associated with agency theory is accountability 
(Mansouri & Rowney, 2014).  Accountability balances the agent’s self-serving behavior 
with sanctions and threats, controlling the agent’s behaviors.  Two managerial 
approaches are common when trying to foster accountability: external control and 
incentive alignment (Mansouri & Rowney, 2014).  Controls guide the decision making 
process and make the individual accountable for any nonaligned choices, while incentives 
encourage decisions aligned with management’s goals. 
The most effective method to address the self-serving nature of agents is a direct 
form of monitoring, but such systems are typically very costly (Schillemans, 2013).  
Additionally, the corrective actions required to keep agents’ actions aligned with investor 
interests will be costly, monetarily and socially.  Such actions will deteriorate the 
relationship between agents and principals.  The focus of such monitoring efforts is 
typically on outputs, performance reporting, and strategic planning (Schillemans, 2013). 
Another concept Wiseman et al. (2012) evaluated pertaining to agency theory is 
power, or more specifically, power concentration.  As power concentration grows with 
the principal, greater oversight and control becomes more likely and the principal can 
impress their agenda upon the agent.  In these circumstances, agents are less likely to be 
incentivized for serving the principal’s agenda, but more likely to be disciplined for not 
achieving the set goals. 
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Wiseman et al. (2012) advocated the divergence of the interests of the key 
principals.  Much like the typical division of responsibilities within the corporate 
structure, separation of the CEO, CFO, and other key executive roles, the principals 
should have divergent goals to ensure a well-rounded business approach.  Not only will a 
collective of unitarily driven principals be unconducive to a successful business, but the 
agents focus on a single goal.  
Critics of agency theory indicate that the theory does not account for the social 
context of principal-agent relationships.  Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodriguez, and Gomez-Meija 
(2012) argued that this criticism is invalid because the flexibility of the theory allows for 
a nontraditional application to settings where the key elements of the theory exist.  These 
elements include information asymmetry, agency cost control mechanisms, and self-
interest driven behavior.   
Stewardship theory.  Stewardship theory, opposing agency theory, argues that 
management will act in the best interest of shareholders inherently (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991).  Authors of stewardship theory attempt to determine the circumstance under which 
agents act toward a common goal on behalf of the principals (Schillemans, 2013).  
Instead of focusing on agency cost of control and losses, the authors attempt to 
understand which conditions will cause agents to function as stewards.   
Authors of stewardship theory do not seek to determine the criteria for completely 
selfless agents, but to find the conditions where the agents are at least partially motivated 
by the interests of the principals (Schillemans, 2013).  . Some self-severing aspect will 
always motivate the agents.  Even when acting strictly on the behalf of the principal, the 
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agent will gain personal and professional growth, satisfaction, and belonging 
(Schillemans, 2013).  The emphasis of the stewardship authors is that the goals of the 
principal and agent coincide, rather than collide, as is the case with agency theory. 
Much like stewardship theory opposes the key tenets of agency theory, 
stewardship theory also counters the position agency theory authors take on CEO duality.  
A study conducted on the benefits of CEO duality determined that the benefit to the 
shareholders, of such shared responsibility, outweighs the negative impact of 
compensation driven choices (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  Donaldson and Davis’s study 
shows that CEOs, with all of the decision making power and little oversight, still serve 
the shareholders. 
Mansouri and Rowney (2014) conducted a study pertaining to the accountability 
and autonomy of medical professionals, but several of their findings can be applied to the 
field of business as well.  Medical professions, when operating on a patient, are charged 
with making autonomous decisions for the patient’s well-being every minute.  The 
medical professional could easily make decisions that will not benefit the patient and 
require additional medical care, to the benefit of the medical professional.  If it is 
assumed that the medical professional will make decisions that are beneficial to the 
patient it can also be assumed that business professions, charged with the care of their 
shareholders wealth, would make the decisions most beneficial to the shareholder.  The 
belief that management will make the decisions best for the business and shareholders, 
rather than the decision that most benefits themselves, is the underlying argument of 
stewardship theory.  Mansouri and Rowney (2014) argued that intrinsic motivators, such 
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as respect and moral values, might better promote the managers to make appropriate 
decisions rather than controls dictating the proper decision.   
O’Leary, Boolaky, and Copp (2013) conducted research to determine if additional 
legislature would improve stewardship.  Based on the core concept that stewards are 
acting on behalf of the principals for an intrinsic reward, legislature changes will not be 
able to improve the steward relationships.  O’Leary, Boolaky, and Copp (2013), focusing 
on directors and audit committees, determined that these groups do not perceive any 
benefit of additional legislature to govern steward arrangements. 
Corporate Governance  
Researchers have studied the topic of corporate governance as a derivative of 
agency theory because the structure of the company and processes exemplify the key 
tenets of agency theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Saltaji, 2013; Wiseman et al., 2012).  
Building proper corporate governance is important to ensure the agents are controlled and 
operating, as the principals would desire (Saltaji, 2013).  The concepts to be considered 
for corporate governance are (a) financial statements, (b) management, (c) internal audit, 
(d) director independence and board structure, (e) owner and management relations, (f), 
organizational structure, and (g) audit committees. 
Financial Statements. Financial statement accuracy is important because there 
are many users of these statements, including investors, managers, board members, and 
other stakeholders.  A study examined the correlation between financial statement 
aggressiveness and three particular governance mechanisms, audit, directors, and 
shareholders (Abdel-Meguid, Ahmed, & Duellman, 2013).  The researchers also factored 
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in the SOX, because this act has a relationship with the governance mechanisms.  The 
researchers found a relationship between auditor dependence and aggressive financial 
statements.  The researchers expounded on this concept attributing the relationship to 
poor governance mechanism prior to the issuance of SOX, as well as subsequent to the 
release of the act.  The researchers also indicated that regulations in corporate 
governance, SOX, for example, are not an adequate substitute for corporate governance 
mechanisms.  Internal audit processes or an active committee can serve as the needed 
corporate governance mechanisms to ensure accurate financial statements.  Internal 
audits can be used to review the financial reporting module to ensure accurate reporting 
and disclosures (Badea, Elefterie, & Spineanu-Georescu, 2014).  Companies with 
involved audit committees produced higher quality financial statements than companies 
with no audit committee or an uninvolved audit committee (Ghafran, & O'Sullivan, 
2013).  Some corporate structures include a role of chief audit executive to oversee the 
entire audit process (Shelton, 2013). 
Ramanan (2014) also examined the effect of an independent board versus a board 
with insiders on the financial statements. The researcher found that a board composed of 
company executives or senior management is more likely to have accurate financial 
reports, while a company with an independent board is more likely to have conservative 
financial statements.  The researcher attributed this to the inherent conservatism of an 
auditor.  There is no penalty for a conservative approach to reporting, while there are 
many issues resulting from aggressive reports.  The researcher also posits that when 
insiders are present on the board the company will create more accurate statements 
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because the board while have more intimate knowledge of the company’s operations and 
results. 
Management.  The next concept in building a corporate hierarchy that promotes 
corporate governance deals with management.  Managers will act in their own best 
interest, rather than that of the company and its investors, when a metric is used to value 
the manager for compensation (Saltaji, 2013).  Managers will inflate importance or 
contribution to the company in order to receive maximum compensation, thereby leading 
to reporting issues and inaccurate financial statements (Saltaji, 2013).  The evaluation 
system of the management is important as well (Jensen & Meckling, 2009).  Basing 
incentives on corporate performance is a contributing factor to fraud because the 
management team uses earning management to maximize incentive earnings (Soltani, 
2014).  Objective market-based compensation packages increase incidents of earnings 
management, indicating that an objective incentive structure alone is insufficient (Baker, 
Gibbons, & Murphy, 1994; Soltani, 2014).  A typical form of compensation is the 
issuance of stock options to management (Sun, 2012).  The value of stock options is 
based on the value of the company.  This is an example of a market value-based 
compensation system that is very commonly associated with earnings management (Sun, 
2012). 
Internal audit.  The next concept in the corporate governance is the impact of an 
internal audit department.  Internal audit functions are interdependent with corporate 
governance (Florea & Florea, 2013).  Internal audit is the first line of defense in risk 
mitigation (Badea et al., 2014).  Internal audit is valuable in corporate governance 
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because it can determine the method by which management achieved a goal (Badea et al., 
2014).  Internal audit can also review the financial reporting module to ensure accurate 
reporting and disclosures.  Internal audit can aid corporate governance by promoting 
moral and ethical values within the entity, increase management operation efficiency, 
increase risk mitigation communication, and stimulate communication between internal 
auditors, external auditors, management, and the board of directors (Badea et al., 2014).   
The structure of the company is important in ensuring that the correct parties 
receive internal audit reports timely (Yuedong, Dong, & Xingyu, 2014).  A lag in internal 
audit reporting decreases among companies with (a) fewer directors, (b) more 
supervisors, (c) higher membership in the audit committee, and (d) fewer supervisory 
meetings (Yuedong et al., 2014).  Companies with structures creating supervisor and 
director independence, frequency of director meetings, and CEO duality showed there 
was little or no effect in reporting lag (Yuedong et al., 2014).   
The structure of the company is also important when assigning the direct 
management responsibility of the internal audit process (Florea & Florea, 2013).  The 
benefits of having the internal audit process governed by the audit committee include 
ability to transcend all departments without limitation, presenting direct information to 
directors and audit committee members, resources not being restricted by management, 
and analysis of the internal audit process and fulfillment of control obligations for the 
board (Florea & Florea, 2013).  The challenges of the internal audit process being 
governed by the audit committee include a sense of the auditors being considered 
outsiders and not involved in all data distribution, time required by the audit committee to 
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govern the process, and further involvement of the audit committee in the day to day 
aspects of the company, potentially sacrificing independence. 
Other researchers have found that internal audit assessments can aid superiors and 
external audits to overcome data overload and focus on issues (Issa & Kogan, 2014).  The 
researchers proposed a model that could serve as a quality review tool, increasing audit 
efficiency and promoting expert knowledge (Issa, & Kogan, 2014).  The model also 
proved effective in allowing auditors to focus on issues in audits increasing the likelihood 
of accurate financial statements (Issa, & Kogan, 2014). 
Researchers have also examined the relationship between governance and internal 
audit report lag (Yuedong et al., 2014).  The researchers found that lag decreased among 
companies having (a) fewer directors, (b) more supervisors, (c) higher membership in the 
audit committee, and (d) fewer supervisory meetings (Yuedong et al., 2014).  The 
researchers also found that independence between supervisors and directors, frequency of 
director meetings, and CEO duality had little or no effect (Yuedong et al., 2014). 
Director independence and board structure.  The concept of duality of roles 
for the CEO of a company is the subject of many studies.  One such study determined 
that companies with a CEO-only board structure were more capable of change with the 
evolution of the industry and regulatory changes (Joseph, Ocasio, & McDonnell, 2014).  
Khemakhem, Gélinas, and Baillargeon (2014) completed a study that investigated the 
impact of adoption of board governance best practices, such as board independence.  The 
researchers found that management of companies that adopted the best practices were 
indistinguishable from companies subject to SOX compliance.  The researchers also 
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found that boards with a greater concern for disclosure governance were more likely to 
adopt the best practices. 
The board structure of companies influences the effectiveness of the company’s 
audit committee and the quality of the financial statements in Spain (García-Sánchez, 
Frias-Aceituno, & Garcia-Rubio, 2012).  Houssem Eddine (2015) found that companies 
can influence certain characteristics of board structures, which affect the audit process by 
testing the financial statements.  These characteristics included the size of the board, the 
size of the audit committee, frequency of audit committee meetings, and financial literacy 
of audit committee members (Houssem Eddine, 2015).  Each of these components 
improve the quality of the audit process and financial statements.   
Researchers have found that improper board structures can lead to ineffective 
financial statement testing in the audit process (Skëndaj, Kraja, & Kalia, 2014).  There 
are no requirements in Albania for all companies to have an audit committee, but such 
committees should be adopted by all companies to protect the shareholders and ensure an 
adequate audit process and quality financial statements (Skëndaj et al., 2014).  
Researchers found that Canadian companies that adopted board structure best practice 
were indistinguishable from SOX-compliant companies (Khemakhem et al., 2014).   
Researchers examined the relationship between audit committee structure and 
earnings management (He & Yang, 2014).  The researchers found that CEO presence on 
the audit committee is positively related to earnings management in unregulated 
industries, industry experts on the committee is negatively related, committee member 
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tenure is negatively related in regulated industries and positively related in unregulated 
industries. 
Researchers have also examined the relationship between audit quality and 
ownership structure in two Tunisian industries (Kouaib & Jarboui, 2014).  The 
researchers found that auditor reputation has a negative relationship with earnings 
management.  Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) found that subsequent to a publicized audit 
failure the Japanese affiliate of audit firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, ChuoAoyama, lost 
nearly 25% of its customers, due to the negative impact on their reputation.  Kouaib and 
Jarboui (2014) also found that audit quality indicators and capital concentration affect 
industries differently, pertaining to earnings management.  Lastly, the researchers found 
that external audit quality and institutional property negatively affected earnings 
management in some industries, while having no effect in others. 
Owner and management relations.  The separation of ownership and 
management can have an effect on the success of the company, depending on the strength 
of the governance (Srinidhi, Shaohua, & Firth, 2014).  Family-run companies with strong 
governance reflect higher earnings quality, addressing the separation of ownership and 
control, while family-run companies without strong governance show similar earnings 
quality to non-family-run businesses (Srinidhi et al., 2014).  Srinidhi et al. (2014) 
attribute the improvement to the commitment to select a specialized auditor with greater 
effort for accuracy and quality, while family-run companies without strong governance 
typically engaged an auditor with low effort or attention to quality.  Specialized audit 
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partners also reduce the prevalence of abnormal accruals in client companies as well 
(Nagy, 2012). 
Organizational Structure. The use of the accounting constructs is only useful if 
management is available and capable of making decisions based on this data.  There are 
two arguments about how the structure of a company assists make these decisions 
efficiently.  The company can either decentralize management or geographically group 
management together.  When this decision is made, there is a trade-off of control costs 
and transfer costs (Christie, Joye, & Watts, 2003).  Transfer costs occur when the 
manager with the knowledge must be sent to the site needing the expertise, while control 
costs occur when the company assigns a lower manager at the site with the rights to make 
decisions (Christie et al., 2003). 
Decentralization of Management. Decentralization of management is the 
assignment of a key decision maker to each operational site or region (Brickley, Smith, 
Zimmerman, & Willett, 2013).  The benefits of such a management distribution are use 
of specific local knowledge, conservation of remote, or senior, management’s time, and 
training of local management (Brickley et al., 2013).  This approach would result in 
multiple managerial accounting systems (MAS) instances within the company, one at 
each site or region where decision makers are located.  The primary setbacks of this 
approach are costs to coordinate with remote sites and ineffective use of centralized data. 
A role where there is an on-going debate to decentralize is the separation of the 
CEO and chairman roles.  Combination of these roles exists in over 80 percent of U.S. 
based companies (Brickley et al., 2013).  Brickley et al. (2013) found no data to show 
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that the combination of these roles is detrimental to the company.  In fact, research has 
even found that no relationship exists between CEO-chairman duality and detriment to 
the company (Makni, Kolsi, & Affes, 2012). 
Geographic Alignment. Centralizing management represents several efficiency 
opportunities for companies, but also represents several issues itself.  In this model, there 
would be one large, unified MAS.  Alignment also allows for various controls, such as 
related party transactions, which are a primary concern (Al-Sa'eed, 2013).  Alignment 
allows for all of these transactions to be reviewed by a single central figure.  
Benefits of centralization.  The benefits include coordination and specialization 
(Brickley et al., 2013).  Combining management into a geographically centralized 
location removes the need for each manager to as a “jack-of-all-trades” and allows for 
specialized knowledge.  Specialization comes with its own set of benefits and costs.  The 
benefits of specialization are the comparative advantage and lower training costs.  
Comparative advantage refers to the expectation that one person will be more efficient if 
they have one task to focus on rather than multiple tasks (Brickley et al., 2013).  The 
disadvantages of specialization are a loss of cross training, increased coordination costs, 
and silos or gatekeepers (Brickley et al., 2013).  Cross training is very important to the 
workflow of a business because it allows for seamless transition during turnover or 
vacation.  Another individual who is trained in the job functions can fill in for an absent 
co-worker.  Silos refers to employees who focus solely on their own tasks and do not 
consider the impact of their actions on the company as a whole.  The term “gatekeepers” 
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refers to employees who have sole access to data and require consultation in order to 
extract information from that dataset.  
Costs of centralization.  The costs of centralizing management include less 
effective use of senior management’s time and issues coordinating the local unit with 
remote units.  Senior management can often become tied up in tasks, which could be 
completed by lower management, thus distracting them from other, more important 
decisions, or tasks (Brickley et al., 2013).  Additionally, if employees have access to 
decision-makers, they will try to influence the decisions being made, where possible 
(Milgrom, 1988). 
The centralization vs. decentralization component of organizational structure 
focuses of the tradeoff made between knowledge transfer costs and control costs (Christie 
et al., 2003).  The company must decide if they want to invest in controls to ensure the 
decisions being made remotely are the most beneficial to the company or invest in the 
costs to transfer the required information needed to make the decision to the centralized 
unit with the authority to make the decision. 
The Decision-Making Process.  The decision-making process is one of the most 
important facets of strategic planning; without the right decisions, by the right people, the 
strategic plan is moot.  Factors requiring consideration in the decision-making process are 
(a) controls, (b) knowledge, (c) process speed, and (d) consistency. 
Controls.  Companies need to consider the time and effort involved in the 
decision-making process and where that responsibility should lie.  If controls do not exist 
to limit the amount of discretionary decision an individual can make, problems will likely 
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result.  For example, when a manager has a discretionary say on a decision, employees 
will attempt to coerce a favorable decision from the manager, wasting the time of both 
the employees and the manager (Milgrom, 1988). Another example is when a manager 
has discretionary say in a decision, the manager may override better judgment and lead to 
a poor outcome (Simkins, 2011).  Plans and guidelines can help to steer the decisions in 
the right direction when discretionary decisions are unavoidable. 
Knowledge.  The key pieces of information required to make a decision are 
knowledge of product costs, knowledge of internal operations, and accounting data 
(Fotache, Fotache, Bucsa, & Ocneanu, 2011).  Knowledge of product costs contributes to 
pricing decisions and product planning.  Operational knowledge allows for organizational 
planning.  Knowledge of accounting data contributes to profit planning and budgeting.  
Specialized knowledge of specific employees aids decision-making process (Brickley et 
al., 2013).  The use of such knowledge can be very useful to the company and utilization 
of such employees built into the strategic plan.   
Management’s emphasis on knowledge presents most at the top tiers of 
companies.  Many large companies are hiring an officer with specialized knowledge in 
planning (Strand, 2014).  In most companies, the CEO and CFO of a company typically 
complete planning, but the installation of an individual bearing a title similar to chief 
sustainability officer has become more prevalent.  The researcher found that there were 
several reasons these positions started appearing in large companies, including addressing 
a concern for future viability and proactively hiring someone to take advantage of an 
opportunity that may be missed otherwise. 
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Process Speed.  Another factor to be considered in the decision-making process is 
decision process speed.  In companies where decisions must be made at remote units, 
decisions made be made onsite, rather than waiting for a corporate office to get all the 
details and make an informed decision.  In this case, consideration for specialized 
knowledge and discretionary decision-making is required.  A study found that certain 
controls, decision process control, goal setting, and extrinsic incentives increased 
decision process speed, while two factors, conflict resolution and negative 
incentivization, had no effect, and finally one factor, strategic imposition, had a negative 
impact of decision process speed (Kownatzki, Walter, Floyd, & Lechner, 2013). 
Consistency.  Another factor of the decision-making process requiring monitoring 
is the consistency of decisions.  Factors that contribute to erratic decision-making require 
accounting and mitigation.  Metacognitive experience and a dynamic environment 
contribute to lowering erratic decisions, while hostile environments increase erratic 
decision prevalence (Mitchell, Shepherd, & Sharfman, 2011).  Similar to discretionary 
decision-making, the prevalence of erratic decisions can negate a strategic plan. 
Audit committees.  The audit committee is one of the most influential 
components on a company’s corporate governance (García-Sánchez et al., 2012).  The 
more involved the committee is, the better the governance of the company (García-
Sánchez et al., 2012).  Countries, where audit committees are not required by regulation, 
tend to have weak governance systems (Skëndaj et al., 2014).  Audit committees with 
greater independence or financial expertise seek a greater level of audit coverage and 
assurance (Ghafran & O'Sullivan, 2013).  Such audit committees seek lower levels of 
30 
 
NAS from the audit firm (Ghafran & O'Sullivan, 2013). Such committee qualities are 
also viewed positively by investors and internal auditors (Ghafran & O'Sullivan, 2013). 
Maintaining the independence of the audit committee is important.  Companies 
with commonality between the audit committee and the compensation committee 
typically have weaker governance and lack the financial and committee resources, as well 
as lower earnings quality (Liao & Hsu, 2013).  A study was completed examining the 
relationship between adoption of stringent governance policy, requiring audit committee 
members to be independent and financially “literate” (Feng & Yue, 2013).  The 
researchers found that companies with low implementation costs and higher future 
financing needs were more likely to adopt the policy.  The researchers found a positive 
relationship between adoption and value and a negative relationship between adoption 
and cost of equity capital. 
Research has found that an effective audit committee can mitigate the risk of 
using an audit firm for services other than the audit (Lisic, 2014).  The researchers 
determined that effective audit committees can reduce earnings management in tax 
expense if the audit committee had the opportunity to weigh and vote on the use of the 
audit firm for tax services.  The research showed that knowledge of the client can 
dominate the potential loss of independence if the audit committee approving the activity 
is knowledgeable and involved. 
A pair of researchers examined the relationship between compensation of board 
members and the prevalence of earnings management (Lynch & Williams, 2012).  The 
researchers, ultimately, found little relationship between earnings management and direct 
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compensation or CEO duality.  The researchers established a correlation between 
earnings management and short-term stock options.  The researchers concluded that 
opportunities to benefit from short-term increases are responsible for this correlation and 
stock restrictions eliminate this issue. 
Under certain circumstances, bypassing the audit committee can have benefits.  
Audit fees are lower when a CFO is more involved in the negotiations than the audit 
committee, in spite of regulation which dictates the audit committee independently 
engage the audit firm and negotiate the terms of the audit (Beck, & Mauldin, 2014).  An 
active and knowledgeable audit committee can influence on shareholder wealth, 
performance, and financial reporting quality (Ionescu, 2014). 
Audit Quality 
The problem presented in the literature is the unknown effect of audit process 
inputs on a company and its stakeholders (Knechel et al., 2013).  Additionally, the 
measure of what constitutes quality varies as well (Knechel et al., 2013).  Audit quality 
has multiple meanings, depending in the population (Knechel et al., 2013).  Users of the 
financial statements view audit quality as the absence of material misstatements.   The 
auditor responsible to conducting the audit views audit quality as the completion of all 
mandated tasks.  The audit firm strives for an audit that is defendable against inspection.  
Regulators view audit quality as an audit that is in compliance with all standards.  A 
consistent, testable indicator for audit quality is not established and an outcome from a 
lack of quality is not immediately or directly observable (Ghany, 2012).   
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DeAngelo (1981) defined a quality audit as one where the auditor is able to locate 
and report on breaches in the client company’s accounting system. An appropriate audit 
also requires the audit firm performing the audit to be completely independent (Arya & 
Glover, 2014).  The problem with this aspect is maintaining this independence can be 
very difficult due to many factors (Arya & Glover, 2014).  One such factor is the 
relationship between the audit firm and the client company is complicated by the vendor-
customer relationship (Asthana & Boone, 2012).  Audit firms may compromise the 
integrity of the audit or lower the audit quality in order to maintain the business with the 
client company (Fatemi, 2012; Schmidt, 2012).  Paterson and Valencia (2011) and 
Hollingsworth and Li (2012), analyzed the effect of audit firms conducting NAS for 
clients, debating the costs and benefits the added dimension to the relationship may have 
on audit quality. 
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, 2015) has identified 
numerous characteristics of the audit, including auditor professionalism, the audit 
process, and audit results that can be used as audit quality indicators.  The PCAOB 
identified availability, competence, and focus as the key points of auditor 
professionalism.  The PCAOB focused further on specific concepts, such as partner, 
manager, and staff workload; specialized skills and knowledge; experience; and industry 
knowledge.  The audit process is further classified by the PCAOB into five categories, 
tone at the top and leadership, incentives, independence, infrastructure, and monitoring 
and remediation.  The PCAOB further categorizes these concepts into audit fees and 
client risk, independence requirements, internal quality review, and PCAOB inspection 
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results.  The final category, audit results, contains the subsets financial statements, 
internal control, going concern, communications between auditors and the audit 
committee, and enforcement and litigation.  Examination of many of the concepts 
identified as audit quality indicators by the PCAOB exists in the coming sections of the 
literature review. 
Authors of articles on audit quality indicated the lack of audit quality in 
perception is just as critical as in fact (Arya & Glover, 2014; Hollingsworth & Li, 2012).  
This is to say that the stakeholders’ belief of the audit quality can affect the company, 
whether the audit firm has conducted a fully compliant or not.  The lack of audit quality 
will, ultimately, have a negative effect on the company (Boone et al., 2012; Dandago & 
Binti Zamro, 2012; Tong, 2006).  One such example of low audit quality resulting in the 
collapse of a company was Sentinel Management Group in 2007 (Cullinan & Rohland, 
2014).  The authors stated that the auditors performing the attestation service, Altschuler, 
Melvoin, and Glasser, LLP, did not test the classification of the company’s assets or 
follow attestation standards.  The firm, therefore, did not find material non-compliances 
with custody regulations.  The company used client assets to qualify for a loan, using the 
attestation of the firm as support.  Later demand of client assets caused a cash shortfall 
and ultimate bankruptcy.   
Another aspect of audit quality tested for correlation is the use of transparency of 
reports in certain jurisdictions (Deumes, Schelleman, Bauwhede, & Vanstraelen, 2012).  
The researchers determined that transparency reports of audit firm governance do not 
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promote audit quality.  The researchers found a weak positive relationship between the 
reports and internal control systems, but this did not translate to improved audit quality. 
Studies, such as Elshafie & Nyadroh (2014), use discretionary accrual 
identification as the proxy for audit quality.  It is, therefore, important to determine if this 
measure is appropriate.  Elshafie and Nyadroh (2014) found that there is a positive 
correlation between discretionary accruals identification and going concern findings.  
This correlation does determine that discretionary accruals are a practical indicator of 
audit quality. 
Research has shown that opinion shopping can have an effect on the cost and 
quality of the audit (Dao, Raghunandan, & Rama, 2012).  The researchers found that 
audit fees are higher for companies in which a shareholder vote occurs to ratify the audit 
firm.  The results of the study also showed that companies who have stopped shareholder 
voting have seen a decrease in audit fees.  Lastly, the researchers found that restatements 
and abnormal accruals are less frequent in audits where shareholders of the client 
company voted on the firm. 
Auditor Independence 
Financial controversies have fueled the debate about auditor tenure and auditor 
independence (Anis, 2014).  Acts, such as SOX, contain language to limit the amount of 
time a partner can serve on a client’s account before requiring to be replaced by another 
partner (Anis, 2014).  Prior to these controversies and the issuance of SOX, there were 
warning signs, as well as a need to continually monitor for now signs of issues (Franzel, 
2014).  Along with audit quality, audit independence at the forefront to ensure investor 
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protection as well as safeguarding public interest (Franzel, 2014).  Research has 
determined that auditor independence is key to the ability to act upon a finding as well 
(Knechel et al., 2013).  Additionally, objectivity and professional skepticism are 
important to the independence (Knechel et al., 2013).  In audits where the risk is 
perceived as high by the audit firm, the approach is predominantly presumptive doubt, 
rather than a neutral approach (Quadackers, Groot, & Wright, 2014).  The perception of 
increased audit quality makes the users of the general-purpose financial statements more 
confident with the statements’ contents.  Following sections will analyze the differing 
approaches of rotating the partner in charge and rotating the entire audit firm.   
Researchers have examined the audit market of Malaysian banks (Dandago & 
Binti Zamro, 2012).  The researchers found that there has been little change in the annual 
appointment of audit firms in a decade, raising the question of the audit independence of 
such a long-standing relationship.  Without regulatory requirements for rotation, the 
researchers propose an evaluation of the impact rotation may have on audits and future 
financial statements (Dandago & Binti Zamro, 2012). 
Fiolleau, Hoang, Jamal, and Sunder (2013) argued that an aspect of auditor 
independence is actually counterproductive to audit quality.  The authors discussed 
regulation as it pertains to audit committee reforms and auditor rotation requirements.  
The authors argued that a primary tenet of these reforms is information is readily 
available and shared at will.  In practice, this is not typically the case.  The authors 
pointed out that companies do not tend to share information and documentation unless 
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requested by the audit firm, for fear of complicating the process or divulging potentially 
harmful information. 
A researcher found a positive relationship between audit quality and audit 
independence (Ojo, 2014).  The researcher states that the audit market should be wary of 
audit concentration, stating that even Big 4 firms are not too big to fail.  The researcher 
argued that mid-tier firms could have higher objectivity and independence, improving the 
quality of audit received from these firms.  
Auditor Size 
Another factor that has a lot of prior research relative to audit quality is the size of 
the audit firm.  Research has shown that Big 4 audit firms issue fewer restatements than 
the smaller firms (Eshleman, & Peng, 2014; Yahn-Shir, Joseph, Mei-Ting, & Ping-Sen, 
2013).  Another research group had the same finding, but also determined that companies 
with restatements tend to have more subsequent restatements, unless the audit firm is 
changed after the first restatement (Files, Sharp, & Thompson, 2014).  Other researchers 
supported the subsequent restatement prevalence, terming this phenomenon a contagion 
effect (Francis & Michas, 2013).  The researchers examined years in which there were 
clients with financial restatements to determine if there was a prevalence of other clients 
with restatements in that year.  Francis and Michas compared the results to a control year 
with no restatements.  The researchers found that there was contagion within the years of 
restatements, which multiple clients needed to restate.  Another pair of researchers 
determined that clients with restatements are more likely to switch audit firms (Mande & 
Myungsoo, 2013).  The researchers also found that the likelihood of firm change 
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increased with the severity of the restatement.  The researchers also found that stock 
prices were more likely to rebound after a restatement if a firm change took place.  Other 
researchers found that individual auditors within the audit firms affect audit quality (Gul, 
Donghui, & Zhifeng, 2013).  Auditors with Big N audit firm experience provide a higher 
quality audit (Gul et al., 2013).  A group of researchers found that one method, a joint 
audit approach, showed higher audit quality than a single Big N firm (Zerni, Haapamäki, 
Järvinen, & Niemi, 2012). 
Ebrahim (2014) found that compliance with Egyptian regulatory requirements 
was positively related to the use of an audit firm with international affiliations.  This also 
reflects that size is a factor for the audit process, showing that larger international firms 
are holding their clients to regulatory compliance while smaller, local firms are not.  The 
lack of conformance to local regulations makes the financial statements reviewed by 
these smaller firms unreliable for investors (Ebrahim, 2014). 
A study regarding the workload of the auditors found that higher workload 
negatively influence audit quality (Lopez & Peters. 2012).  The researchers found that 
companies with a typical calendar fiscal year have a higher likelihood of abnormal 
accruals.  This is due to the higher concentration of audits being conducted at the same 
time, increasing the workload on auditors.  This work overload can bypass the firm’s 
quality control mechanisms and hinder the audit quality at the engagement level.  
Another pair of researchers supported this theory.  Sundgren and Svanström (2014) 
examined the relationship between the auditor-in-charge’s (AIC) portfolio and audit 
quality, as proxied by a going-concern finding, or opinion of stability or distress.  The 
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researchers found that an AIC’s number of engagements negatively impacts the number 
of going-concern findings issued.  This suggests that the AIC is not as thorough to 
compensate for a higher workload, or willfully overlooks negative information to avoid 
the issues involved in a going-concern finding. 
Partner Rotation 
Researchers have found a need to compare differing regulations pertaining to 
audit partner rotation across different countries (Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield, & Higgs, 
2013).  Researchers studied the effects of mandatory auditor rotation on audit quality, 
both directly and indirectly (Daugherty et al., 2012).  The direct effects included 
independence, perspective, and client specific knowledge, while the indirect include 
relocation and training.  The researchers also found that longer audit tenure contributed to 
quality and client knowledge.  Alternatively, those surveyed indicated that rotation 
contributes to independence, in fact and perception.  The surveyed partners also 
articulated a belief that rotation decrease inappropriate client attachment, but felt there 
was no benefit to accelerating the rotation schedule or extending the cool off period.  
Additionally, the researchers discussed the auditor quality of life.  The concept that a firm 
may have limited partners in a geographic region, requiring relocation and training of 
partners at the rotation period can contribute to audit partner discontent and lower audit 
quality (Daugherty et al., 2012).  Each of these concepts, direct and indirect, affect the 
audit process and the financial statement review, thus affecting the quality and accuracy 
of the statements.  Researchers have also concluded that partner rotation results in higher 
ex-ante costs and diminishes audit quality (Azizkhani, Monroe, & Shailer, 2013). 
39 
 
Other researchers conducted a study to measure the relationship between audit 
partner tenure and a going concern finding (Monroe & Hossain, 2013).  The researchers 
used a previous study as a baseline for comparison.  The previous study found a negative 
correlation between partner tenure and issuing a going concern finding.  The completion 
of the prior study was before the implementation of a mandatory partner rotation.  The 
research conducted by the authors in the current study found a correlation between audit 
partner tenure and the issuance of a going concern finding.  The authors articulated a 
belief that the change is due to the implementation of the mandatory partner rotation. 
Another study examined the prevalence of audit adjustments in the last year of a 
partner’s tenure and the first year of a partner’s tenure (Lennox, Xi, & Tianyu, 2014).  
The study showed that adjust are more frequent in these two circumstances than in 
interim periods of an audit partner’s tenure.  The researchers indicated that this increase 
is due to the knowledge that another auditor was, or will be, involved in the audit, 
prompting a more thorough review.  A more thorough review results in a higher quality 
audit for the client, supporting partner rotation.  Luminita (2014) supported this research, 
also finding that audits have a higher quality in the final year of tenure and in the first 
year of tenure than any other years.  This is because in the final year of tenure the 
engagement and review partners are more stringent, knowing that other auditors will be 
reviewing their work the following year.  In the first year of tenure, the quality is higher 
because there is a new perspective on the presentation and controls.  This new analysis 
causes the client to review long-standing procedures for compliance with regulations.  
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One researcher determined that there were internal control weaknesses in the first couple 
years with a new partner (Nicolaescu, 2013). 
Firm Rotation 
Dandago and Binti Zamro (2012) conducted research to determine if a mandate to 
change audit firms at a prescribed interval would have a beneficial or adverse effect on 
auditor independence and audit quality.  Several countries have adopted regulations that 
require audit firm rotation (Anis, 2014).  Anis found that auditors believe mandatory 
auditor rotation will increase audit quality.  The researcher also found that auditors 
indicated an average tenure requirement of 3.8 years to establish acceptable audit quality 
and the perception of auditor rotation increases auditor independence, but at the cost of 
client specific knowledge.  
Inversely, researchers in Spain found that audit quality does not increase with 
longer audit tenure (Blandon & Argiles Bosch, 2013).  Spain has a regulation requiring 
termed contracting of audit firms, between three and nine years, without the allowance of 
the reelection of the same firm (Blandon & Argiles Bosch, 2013).  The researchers also 
discussed the specific trade-off that audit firms are attempting to balance, loss of client 
versus lawsuit or defamation, which can contribute to the audit quality and financial 
statement review. 
A group of researchers conducted a study to determine the factors that are most 
likely to lead to the retention of an audit firm by a client (Butcher, Harrison, & Ross, 
2013).  The researchers determined that the highest-ranking factors were audit quality, 
based on expertise, and service, based on responsiveness to the client’s needs.  
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Communication showed positively in the evaluation, as a component of responsiveness.  
Conversely, client knowledge, audit costs, regulations, and market concentration are 
significant factors related to audit rotation (Daugherty, Dickins, Higgs, & Tatum, 2013).  
The authors reinforced the concern that auditors have about losing audit quality due to 
audit change and loss of client knowledge (Daugherty, Dickins, Higgs, et al., 2013).  The 
knowledge that the firm acquires over a period of time working with a client is lost 
during rotation, requiring rebuilding (Daugherty, Dickins, Higgs, et al., 2013).  
Expanding on this concept, the authors addressed the concept of audit costs.  Firms will 
incur additional costs while a new auditor learns about a client due to a required rotation 
(Daugherty, Dickins, Higgs, et al., 2013).  The firm passes these costs to the client, 
driving up the audit fees.  The authors also addressed the adequacy of current rotation 
regulations.  The authors argued that Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) sufficiently addressed 
shareholder distrust by promoting audit committee responsibility to protect shareholder 
interests (Daugherty, Dickins, Higgs, et al., 2013).  If there are few firms in a given 
region, a client company will be required to engage a less adequate firm upon force 
rotation.  The resulting audit quality will suffer due to the insufficient knowledge and 
expertise held by the new firm (Daugherty, Dickins, Higgs, et al., 2013). 
The author of another article articulated that firm rotation should result in 
professional skepticism, independence, and objectivity (Kroll, 2012).  The author also 
contrasted the current regulations in the US with the regulations enacted in Europe, which 
has a six-year rotation requirement with a possible two-year extension.  The author also 
argued that firm rotation would result in higher quality audits, because the current firm 
42 
 
will be more thorough in identifying issues if they know another firm will be reviewing 
their work. 
Researchers of another study compared a period of time when audit firm rotation 
was mandatory with companies who had long-tenured firms prior to implementation and 
companies who voluntarily rotated after the removal of the regulation (Soo Young, 
Youngdeok, & Simnett, 2014).  The researchers found no material difference in the 
quality of the audits provided in the three circumstances.  The researchers did note a 
significant increase in audit fees after the implementation, which rose even more after 
removal of the regulation. 
Another author indicated several issues to the proposal of firm rotation, including 
the untested value of such rotation, lack of options for some companies, loss of corporate 
knowledge, and NAS (Hollein, 2012).  A company that operates multi-nationally has 
very few options for audit firms, which causes additional issues if the company must 
rotate firms on a regular schedule (Hollein, 2012).  Researchers have also addressed the 
concepts of client knowledge, audit costs, regulations, and market concentration as 
related to audit rotation (Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield, et al., 2013).   
Non-Audit Services (NAS) 
The next aspect of an audit, which compromises or negatively effects the audit, is 
NAS (Hollingsworth & Li, 2012; Paterson & Valencia, 2011).  The difficulty is 
determining the effect of an audit firm conducting NAS is the process of isolating the 
NAS from the audit (Gaver & Paterson, 2014).  Gaver and Paterson indicated that the 
only way to isolate the effect on audit quality is to hold the NAS quality constant, which 
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is impractical, but the quality of the NAS varies as must as the audit itself.  The client and 
customer conflict is complicated because it can cause the audit firm to choose between 
continued revenue streams from the customer, but compromised regulatory obligations as 
a client.  If the client company does not like the result the audit firm is providing the 
client can threaten to take their business elsewhere (Tong, 2006).  The firm then has to 
choose between the revenue generated from the client and the requirements prescribed by 
the governing bodies, such as the SEC.   
Causholli, Chambers, and Payne (2014) found that high NAS fee growth clients 
are more likely to have earnings management, suggesting that the quality of the audit is 
lower for clients with higher future NAS fee income potential for the audit firm.  Another 
group of researchers found that institutional monitoring is an important aspect when a 
client uses their audit firm for services other than the audit (Lim, Ding, & Charoenwong, 
2013).  The researchers found that clients with low institutional monitoring sacrificed 
audit quality by using the firm for additional services, while clients with high monitoring 
did not lose any audit quality.   
SOX limited the type of NAS an audit firm may provide to an audit client 
(Prawitt, Sharp, & Wood, 2012).  Prior to the issuance of SOX, it was most beneficial to 
use a single Big N firm for both the audit and NAS, creating the independence issues 
which led to the high-profile collapses (Prawitt et al., 2012).  The use of another Big N, 
non-Big N, or in-house NAS management were less effective options, increasing 
restatement risk. 
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Auditor independence is a common concern when it pertains to conducting NAS 
for an audit client (Schmidt, 2012).  Audit litigation and NAS are positively related, 
showing that the lawsuits against the audit firm commonly occur if the company required 
a restatement (Schmidt, 2012).  Additionally, a positive relationship exists between 
litigation and the ratio of NAS fees to total fees (Schmidt, 2012). 
Fee Structure 
Researchers have found that audit restatements are a result of low audit effort or 
underestimating the risk associated with the audit (Blankley, Hurtt, & MacGregor, 2012).  
The researchers found in this study that abnormal fees are negatively related to audit 
quality.  The researchers of an additional study examined the relationship between audit 
experience and audit fees and audit quality (Cahan & Sun, 2015).  Audit quality was 
proxied in this study as the existence of discretionary accruals, where accruals equated to 
lower quality.  The researchers found that experience is positive related to fees and 
negatively related to the presence of accruals.  Additionally, the researchers found that a 
number of other factors could be indicators of audit quality, including auditor gender, 
tenure, specialization, education, and client importance.  Johnstone, Chan, and Shuqing 
(2014) conducted research on the relationship of fees and quality, specifically pertaining 
to the audit firm’s industry knowledge of the client’s business ().   
A group of researchers found that audit fee disclosure timing can improve 
company performance (Hackenbrack, Jenkins, & Pevzner, 2014).  The researchers found 
that audit fee fluctuation positively relates to negative results (Hackenbrack et al., 2014).  
The reporting lag of the audit fees is, therefore, detrimental to investor knowledge and 
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decision-making (Hackenbrack et al., 2014).  Another group of researchers conducted a 
study that analyzed the length of a relationship between auditor and client and the 
likelihood of a going concern modified (GCM) finding (Blay & Geiger, 2013).  Blay and 
Geiger found that the issuance of a GCM is greatly reduced in circumstances where the 
audit has significantly higher future fee revenue from the client. 
Another group of researchers examined the effect of CEO turnover on audit fees 
(Hua-Wei, Parker, Yun-Chia Anderson, & Yi-Hung, 2014).  Hua-Wei et al. determined 
that forced turnover of the CEO positively related to increased audit fees.  The 
researchers stated that forced turnover of the CEO is a risk for the audit.  The researchers 
found no prevalence of increased fees for voluntary turnover or no turnover. 
Client and Customer Dynamic 
The relationship between the audit firm and its client is another source of issue in 
the audit process (Asthana & Boone, 2012; Hollingsworth & Li, 2012).  The NAS 
provided by the audit firm can include many services, one of which being advisory 
services (Fatemi, 2012).  This can compromise the independence of the audit firm 
because the firm is telling the client company how to handle a certain set of 
circumstances, the implication of this action is the auditor loses objectivity.   
Audit firms will sometimes offer an introductory fee structure in order to acquire 
a client company, but studies have found that audit quality has suffered due to this 
(Asthana & Boone, 2012).  The audit firm must find ways to cut cost to avoid or mitigate 
a loss at the lower revenue, often resulting in cutting staff hours and decreasing the 
testing.  Beck and Mauldin (2014) found that companies, where the CFO is more 
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prominent in the audit fee negotiation, have lower fees than companies where this is 
handled by an audit committee.   
The penetration an audit firm has into the company’s business model also 
contributes to the retention rate (Butcher et al., 2013).  Treating the client like a customer 
and providing as many services as possible reflects positively on the firm during the 
renewal process.  However, an over-reliance on a single customer for a significant 
portion of revenue has a negative perceptual effect on the client’s investor base, resulting 
in concerns and heightened potential for firm rotation (Hollingsworth & Li, 2012).   
Other studies have found multiple aspects of the client-auditor relationship that 
affect auditor independence and audit quality.  In one such study, the researchers 
determined that audit engagement bidding, engagement length, NAS, firm size, industry 
expertise, and former employees of the client working for the audit firm all affect audit 
quality (Hoa, Pesi, Thanh, & Sang, 2014).  The researchers determined that engagement 
length, firm size, and industry expertise are all positively related to audit quality, while 
employment of former audit personnel is negatively related to audit quality (Hoa et al., 
2014). 
Market Concentration 
Market concentration is another aspect of the audit process that may have an 
effect on the audit (Boone et al., 2012).  Researchers examined the relationship between 
audit market concentration and earnings management tolerance (Boone et al., 2012).  The 
researchers found the increased concentration contributed to higher earnings management 
precedency.  The researchers indicated that increased concentration, meaning fewer 
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competitive local audit firms, can result in complacency, leniency, and less professional 
skepticism. 
Researchers in China have examined the relationship between auditor industry 
expertise and audit quality and restatements when an auditor is used that is common to 
many members of the company’s supply chain (Yu-Ting, Zishang Liu, & Ya-Fang, 
2014).  The researchers found that an incumbent audit firm with industry expertise is 
negatively associated with discretionary accruals and restatements (Yu-Ting et al., 2014).  
An incumbent audit firm alone does not have the same effect on audit quality, but an 
incumbent or expert firm has a negative relationship with restatement (Yu-Ting et al., 
2014).   
Other researchers have shed a negative light on market concentration.  
Researchers investigated the theory that the domination of the audit market by the Big 4 
is harmful to audit quality (Francis, Michas, & Seavey, 2013).  The supporting argument 
is founded on the premise that if a company has few options for audit firms, they will not 
be able to push the audit firm to conduct a quality audit.  Without options and 
competition, the Big 4 can conduct audits at whatever quality level they like and not fear 
losing clients (Francis et al., 2013).  The researchers also examined the effect of cross-
border audits.  While the researchers did not find any evidence that Big 4 dominion 
negatively affected audit quality, they suggest continuous monitoring (Francis et al., 
2013).  Researchers conducted a study to determine if local auditors conduct higher 
quality audits (Choi, Kim, Qiu, & Zang, 2012).  For the study, an auditor was qualified as 
local if their offices are in the same metropolitan statistical area or within 100 kilometers 
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of the client’s offices.  The researchers found that local auditors do conduct higher 
quality audits (Choi et al., 2012).  This is significant for companies with remote main 
offices where there is no a lack of a local auditor.  Newton, Wang, and Wilkins (2013) 
found that market concentration is positively related to restatements. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) 
Abdel-Meguid et al. (2013) and Kao et al. (2013) conducted research to determine 
the effect SOX has had on audit quality ().  One particularly closely examined aspect of 
SOX is section 404, which covers internal controls.  Specifically, SOX section 404 
requires a company to disclose an assessment of the company’s internal controls over 
financial reporting as well as the audit firm’s assessment of such controls (Erickson, 
Lukes, & Weber, 2014).  Many companies challenged this section due to the excessive 
cost of compliance (Shaw & Terando, 2014).  According to Beattie, Fearnley, and Hines 
(2012), the primary mandates made by SOX section 404 were process and compliance 
related, which produced little benefit for companies with very high costs.  One of the 
focuses of these controls relates to information technology (IT) aspects.  Companies with 
significant IT controls reduce risks and mitigate audit fee increases (Yunhao, Smith, Jian, 
& Weidong, 2014).  Researchers have also found that SOX successfully reduced earnings 
management in companies with a Big-4 audit, but did not affect the level of earnings 
management in other companies (Rutledge, Karim, & Xiaoqin, 2014). 
SOX established the partner tenure rules and cool down periods in effect in the 
United States (Litt, Sharma, Simpson, & Tanyi, 2014).  Litt et al. determined that audit 
quality is higher in the final two years of their tenure than that of the first two years.  The 
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researchers posited that auditor knowledge is one factor affecting the findings, as well as 
the awareness that a new auditor would be reviewing their work in the coming years.  
The researchers determined that the effect is amplified in larger companies. 
The PCAOB created SOX and acts as one of the primary oversight entities in the 
United States (Palmrose, 2013).  One of the standards proposed by the PCAOB was 
Audit Standard No 5.  The standard, titled An Audit of Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial Statement, was proposed in an 
effort to reduce audit costs, while maintaining audit quality (Dechun & Jian, 2012).  The 
authors found that the standard reduced costs by making audits more efficient, while 
making no material change to the audit quality.  Many audit partners feel that the PCAOB 
is mostly focused on locating deficiencies and PCAOB inspections are invasive and 
increase litigation risk (Houston & Stefaniak, 2013). 
Wedemeyer (2014) argued that audit quality, in terms of standards and 
compliance, has increased greatly since the inception of SOX and the creation of 
PCAOB.  The author stated that audits have become more expensive, raising audit fees, 
due to the incorporation of reviews of internal controls for financial reporting, increased 
review requirements, and other quality control activities.  The author also states that the 
creation of the PCAOB has increased the likelihood of the review of a given audit, even 
when no sign of deficiency or error is present. 
Others have questioned the enactment of SOX and if the enactment occurred 
without true consideration for the ramifications (Gupta et al., 2013).  The authors support 
this question by articulating that two acts, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
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Consumer Protection Act and the 2012 Jump Start Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, 
exempted SEC filers from required compliance of specific SOX requirements.  The 
authors articulated the public perceived these two acts as attempts to hedge the impact of 
SOX, therefore acknowledging the oversights made by hastily mandating internal control 
reporting. 
Another researcher found benefits and drawbacks to the enactment of SOX.  The 
researcher examined the relationship between management communication and the 
implementation of SOX (Oi Lin, 2014).  The researcher found that the implementation of 
SOX increased the comprehensibility and truthfulness in the discussion of the company’s 
operations.  The researcher also determined that SOX lowered legitimacy.  The 
researcher concluded that companies are making statements that are factual and 
understandable, but using distractions to draw the attention from issues. 
Transition  
The first section of this qualitative case study included the (a) background of the 
problem, (b) problem statement, (c) purpose statement, (d) nature of the study, (e) 
research question, (f) interview questions, (g) conceptual framework, (g) operational 
definitions, (h) assumptions, limitations, and delimitations, (i) significance of study, and 
(j) literature review.  The literature identified many studies previously completed on 
specific components of the audit process, as well as several components found to affect 
audit quality.  The focus of the study was to examine what strategies can client managers 
and boards use to facilitate an engagement, provide relevant evidence, and support 
management assertion. 
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In this section I articulate the basis for the study, as well as justified the need for 
this research.  The varied findings in the literature review supported the selection of an 
in-depth study design, justifying a qualitative case study, rather than other methods or 
designs.  The literature review provided additional insight to the possible factors affecting 
audit quality, but also contained studies with contradictory findings.   
In the next section of this study, I provide the structure for the research, as well as 
the analysis method.  The sections includes (a) the role of the researcher, (b) participants, 
(c) further justify the research method and design, (d) participants, (e) data collection and 
analysis, and (f) reliability and validity. 
In the final section I present the findings of my research, as well as professional 
and social implications of the findings.  The section also includes recommendations for 
future actions and additional research.  Finally, the section contains a summary and 
conclusion of my study. 
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Section 2: The Project 
In this study, I used open-ended questions, along with directed follow-up 
questions, to explore the participants’ views of the audit process and to determine where 
breakdowns exist.  In this section, I will articulate the structure of the study as well as 
how this structure achieved the goals of the study.  This section will include (a) the 
purpose statement, (b) role of the researcher, (c) participants, (d) research method, (e) 
research design, (f) population and sampling, (g) ethical research, (h) data collection 
instruments, technique, organization, and analysis, and (i) reliability and validity. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to determine what 
strategies client managers and boards can use to facilitate an engagement with an audit 
firm and effectively carry out their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence 
and support for their management assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  The 
population included individuals that make up the audit team who are involved in the 
annual financial statement audit for a Connecticut-based public company.  Data 
collection included open-ended interviews and public data available on the company. The 
implication for positive social change includes the potential to have a better insight to 
audit processes.  Improved insight to the audit process may promote investor confidence 
in the financial statements and economic growth through capital spending.  
Role of the Researcher 
The role of the researcher is to collect data through face-to-face interviews and 
secondary sources and thematically analyze the findings for recurring responses and 
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trends (Anderson, 2010).  In a case study, the researcher is attempting to create an in-
depth understanding through an exhaustive study of the problem in its natural setting 
(Anderson, 2010).  I have worked as an audit liaison within two separate companies, 
providing me with knowledge of the topic as a researcher.  The participants were all 
members of a company at which I have professional contacts. 
I did not utilize any participants whom are part of a protected class to ensure no 
ethical issues as identified in the Belmont Report (National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1979).  The 
Belmont Report identified three components of protection of human participants: (a) 
beneficence, (b) justice, and (c) respect for persons (National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1979).  
Beneficence is the concept related to minimizing potential risks in order to do no harm.  
This is accomplished by outlining a plan to protect the participants’ rights and taking any 
necessary measures to ensure these rights are protected.  Justice refers to the fairness of 
treatment of participants and dissemination of research findings, irrelevant of the research 
expectations or goals.  Respect for persons pertains to the voluntary nature of 
participation by all subjects and withdraw from the study at any time as well as provide 
informed consent to participate. 
Anderson (2010) indicated that bias is mitigated by isolating prior knowledge of 
the problem and focusing solely on the responses given in the interviews and the 
secondary sources.  If responses in the interviews were ambiguous, follow-up questions 
determined the respondent’s intent (Doody & Noonan, 2013).  I did not use secondary 
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sources without concise articulation of finding, unless other sources could frame the 
information, providing clarification. 
The use of an interview protocol facilitates flexibility in the interview process and 
allows for a smooth process in the course of interviewing participants (Abdulai & 
Shafiwu, 2014). Wang, Xiang, and Fesenmaier (2014) suggested that an interview 
protocol helps maintain consistency among the interviews.  Thus, I used an interview 
protocol as a guide to my interviews (Appendix E).   
Participants 
A case study is limited in scope to a particular issue at a specific site (Diefenbach, 
2009).  Qualitative case studies require using participants with previous experience of 
knowledge of the problem (Yin, 2014).  Englander (2012) highlighted the importance that 
participants have experienced the researched phenomenon.  Thus, I restricted my data 
collection to a single company in New London County, Connecticut.  The eligibility 
criteria consisted of individuals with direct involvement in the audit process within one 
small organization in Connecticut and its audit firm.  The participants were all members 
of a company at which I have professional contacts, granting me access.  
Establishing a comfortable interaction with the participants promoted detailed 
responses to questions (Doody & Noonan, 2013).  Seidman (2013) advocated conferring 
the method of confidentiality and anonymity maintenance as a means of building trust.  
To establish this comfortable interaction, I encouraged potential participants to ask 
questions about the research study and process prior to consenting to participating.  Due 
to ease of access, many of these conversations were be face to face, with some occurring 
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through email.  Once a participant agreed to participate in the study, I asked that they 
complete a consent form.  Upon completion of the consent form, the participant and I 
agreed to a mutually acceptable time and place for the interview, which provided privacy 
for the interview duration. 
Following the guidance of Rowley (2012), interviews were conducted face to face 
and, with each participant’s approval, recorded for accuracy.  This format allowed for 
flexibility of follow-up questions for further probing and helped to accommodate the 
interviewee.  Additionally, I took notes during the interviews about any observations 
during the interviews.  Interviews continued until the study reaches data saturation, 
interviewing all participants cyclically.  Saturation occurs when the participants offer no 
new ideas or emergent patterns (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012). 
Upon receiving Walden University and IRB approval, I visited the target 
company to discuss, with the executive team, the purpose of the research, criteria for 
participation, and confidentiality and informed consent process.  Once the company 
agreed to participate and made employees, who met the criteria, available for interviews, 
I provided the company with a prepared Data Use Agreement form (Appendix A) and 
asked for a Letter of Cooperation from a Research Partner (Appendix B) signed by an 
officer of the company.  The company provided me with the contact information for the 
individuals meeting the criteria for participation.  The next step was to contact each of 
these individuals, explaining to them the purpose of the research, criteria for 
participation, and confidentiality and informed consent process.  I obtained as many 
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participants as available from the company’s listing as well as from the company’s audit 
firm.   
Research Method and Design  
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to determine what 
strategies client managers and boards can use to facilitate an engagement with an audit 
firm and effectively carry out their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence 
and support for their management assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  I 
interviewed the employees of a company located in New London County, Connecticut 
and its audit firm to build an in-depth analysis of the audit process characteristics that 
affect audit quality.  During a review of the available methods and designs, I determined 
the appropriate structure for this study was a qualitative case study.  A qualitative case 
study fits the approach for this study, which was interviewing employees about the 
problem in its natural setting, using an exhaustive in-depth interview process.   
Research Method 
Selection of the appropriate research method is important to obtaining valid 
results (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013).  The three method of research are (a) qualitative, (b) 
quantitative, and (c) mixed method.  The selection of the appropriate method is based on 
three components, a research-worthy problem, substantive peer-reviewed literature, and 
data (Yilmaz, 2013).  The chosen method for this study was qualitative because I focused 
on the thematic issues that surfaced during the literature review and research phase of the 
study.  Qualitative methodology was appropriate for this study because it is the standard 
for the conventional ways of doing in-depth interviews (Barnham, 2012). 
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A quantitative study is appropriate when determining the significance of a 
relationship between reduced variables (Yilmaz, 2013).  The purpose of this qualitative 
exploratory case study was to determine what strategies client managers and boards can 
use to facilitate an engagement with an audit firm and effectively carry out their 
responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence and support for their management 
assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  Additionally, a quantitative method 
typically to tests an existing theory, rather than build an understanding of a phenomenon 
(Fassinger & Morrow, 2013). 
A mixed method study involves the use of both qualitative and quantitative 
research traits, benefiting from the strengths of each (Venkatesh et al., 2013). A mixed 
method study was also not ideal because the depth involved in this study requires focus 
on a singular site in its natural setting, while the quantitative portion of a mixed method 
study would require a wider spectrum of information for evaluation (Fassinger & 
Morrow, 2013).  A mixed method approach to this study was inappropriate due to the 
inclusion of quantitative components inconsistent with the research purpose. 
Research Design 
The design of a study is determined, in large part by the data being collected 
(Aastrup & Halldorsson, 2003).  The design types, within the qualitative method chosen 
include (a) case study, (b) phenomenological, (c) ethnography, and (d) action research 
(Kramer-Kile, 2012). The design for this research was a case study.  A case study has a 
singular setting or targeted focus (Løkke & Sørensen, 2014).  A case study was 
appropriate for this study because turnover within companies can limit the knowledge 
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base of employees, pertaining to the history of the company.  Thus, in-depth research of 
the company’s public documents and lengthy interviews was required.  Methodological 
triangulation ensured claims were evidence based (Anderson, 2010).  I achieved 
saturation by cyclically interviewing the participants until no new themes or codes 
emerged (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012). 
A phenomenological study, involving several sites, would have required very 
lengthy interviews to evaluate the detailed topics this study covered, rather than focusing 
on one unique case (Small, 2009).  Additionally, as subsequent interviewees reveal new 
concepts, the previous interviewees needed re-interviewing about these concepts (Small, 
2009).  With a single-site case study, the interviewees were all located together making 
the interview process feasible.   
Ethnography studies focus on an in-depth qualitative investigation of a problem 
within a group sharing a common culture (Small, 2009).  Ethnography often provides a 
chronology of the group or culture and the research problem (Small, 2009).  An 
ethnographic study was inappropriate because the study addressed a business problem 
that exists worldwide and is not be limited to one ethnicity or culture.   
Action research identifies and investigates a localized practical problem in an 
effort to find a solution (Ellis & Levy, 2009).  In action research, the researcher is 
typically a practitioner facing the problem and is in a position to create a solution and test 
the results, noting the outcomes and repeating as necessary (Ellis & Levy, 2009).  Action 
research was not appropriate for this study because the problem exists worldwide and I 
could not implement and test solutions. 
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Population and Sampling 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to determine what 
strategies client managers and boards can use to facilitate an engagement with an audit 
firm and effectively carry out their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence 
and support for their management assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  
Resembling a study by Sheeran et al. (2012), I used census sampling, targeting all 
appropriate individuals made available by the target company, with a base knowledge 
required to adequately answer the interview questions in order to acquire the required 
data from the interviews.  Census sampling is appropriate when interviewing the total 
population for a bound system is feasible (Sheeran et al., 2012).  Nonprobabilistic 
sampling allows the qualification of participants to ensure such a base knowledge, while 
probabilistic sample requires random selection (Daniel, 2012).  The sample population 
for this study was a single public company in New London County, Connecticut and its 
audit firm.  The financial statements of the selected company showed several historic 
events have occurred with this company consistent with the theories offered in the 
literature review.  Such events include deregistration from the SEC since the issuance of 
SOX, a financial restatement, an audit partner rotation, and an audit firm change.   
Dissimilar to quantitative research, participants in qualitative studies are not 
collected to gather a count of opinions or people or another quantifiable number 
(O’Reilly & Parker, 2012).  Instead, qualitative studies focus on the range and 
representation of the opinions and issues, providing rich data (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012).  
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Interviews continued until the study reached saturation.  Saturation occurred when the 
participants offered no new ideas or emergent patterns (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012). 
Similar to Alfonso, Nichelson, and Cohen (2012), I conducted in-depth interviews 
and reviewed additional data. In-depth interviews with all employees and auditors 
involved in the audit process, from various levels within the company, provided rich data 
regarding many audit process input characteristics.  These interviews, coupled with 
research on the company, provided a holistic view of the target company.  The criterion 
for eligibility to participate in this study was prior experience in audit process from the 
client or auditor side.  Provided the varying nature of experience and knowledge of the 
participants and the in-depth nature of the interviewing process, all available individuals 
involved in the audit process provided enough substantive data to evaluate.  Saturation 
occurred by continuing interviews until themes offered were repetitive, producing no new 
information or themes, and did not provide any new insights, views, or opinions 
(O’Reilly & Parker, 2012). I discussed each employee for whom the company offered 
contact information with my organizational contact I worked with, to determine if the 
individual was appropriate for the study.  I then contacted each participant appropriate for 
the study to participate. 
Ethical Research 
Upon receiving Walden University and IRB approval, I visited the target 
company to discuss, with each potential participant, the purpose of the research, criteria 
for participation, and confidentiality and informed consent process.  Walden University’s 
approval number for this study is 03-28-16-0290102.  I encouraged potential participants to 
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ask questions about the research study and process prior to consenting to participating.  
Due to ease of access, many of these conversations were face to face with some occurring 
through email.  Once a participant agreed to participate in the study, (s)he completed a 
consent form face to face (Appendix D).  Study participation was voluntary at all times 
and provided no incentives to participate. 
The consent form included (a) researcher contact information, (b) sponsoring 
institution contact information, (c) purpose of the study, (d) voluntary nature of the study, 
(e) ability to withdraw from study, (f) confidentiality safeguards, and (g) storage and 
disposal of study materials.  Participants signed, dated, and returned the consent form and 
had the opportunity to ask questions, face to face, at that time.  If a participant wished to 
withdraw from the study at any time, they needed to notify me of such desire.  To protect 
the participants’ identities, each participant received a number.  I placed all 
correspondence and interview information in password-protected files and saved on a 
flash drive.  I will securely maintain the data for a 5-year period before destruction. 
Researchers have a responsibility to the study participants to protect the 
confidentiality of the participants and obtain inform consent from each participant (Yin, 
2014).  Researchers must identify themselves, the purpose of the research, and provide 
assurance of confidentiality (Rowley, 2012).  Additionally, the researcher must adhere to 
the rules of research for human subjects set forth by the Belmont Report (National 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, 1979).  These rules include mitigating risk, fair treatment, and informed 
consent.  In order to ensure comprehensive knowledge of the rules governing research 
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involving human subjects, I obtained certification from the National Institute of Health 
Office of Extramural Research (Appendix C). 
Data Collection Instruments  
The primary data collection instrument in a qualitative research study is the 
researcher, who gathers data through interviews and interactions (Houghton, Casey, 
Shaw, & Murphy, 2013).  Seidman (2013) also identified the research as the primary data 
collection instrument.  The interface for data collection was semistructured interviews.  
Semistructured interviews allow flexibility of follow-up questions for further probing and 
help to accommodate the interviewee (Rowley, 2012).  Seidman (2013) indicated that 
semistructured interviews allow the participants to guide the direction of the 
conversation, revealing the information they feel is relevant.  Interviews began with 
introductions, including my background and overview of the research topic, as well as the 
background of the interviewee.  Doody and Noonan (2013) stated that an interview 
protocol can promote consistency of interaction between participants and add to the 
structure (Appendix E).  I asked the participant to review the consent form and ask 
questions prior to signing.  The participant received a copy of the consent form, if 
desired, and reminded that participation was voluntary and can be withdrawn at any time.  
I informed the interviewee that the interview would be recorded and notes would be 
taken.  The duration of interviews were approximately 30 minutes, addressing the seven 
interview questions and relevant follow-up questions.  Member checking enhanced the 
accuracy of interpretations of the information provided by the interviewees.  I made a 
follow-up meeting with the participant to review the interpretations of the interview for 
63 
 
accuracy and completeness, which required no more than 5 minutes of the participant’s 
time.  
Years of experience in accounting and working with auditors prepared me for the 
face-to-face interviews, allowing me to engage the participants and follow up their 
responses to the open-ended questions with directed questions to better understand their 
positions and perceptions.  In the process of identifying interview questions (Appendix 
F), I assessed any preconceptions I may have had about the topic in order to recognize 
and mitigate personal bias.  Similar to Diefenbach (2009), I recorded interviews, and 
complemented recordings with notes taken during the interviews to reflect non-audio 
cues of the interviewees.  The use of member checking increased the accuracy of 
interview data.  Member checking involves presenting interpretations of the interviews to 
participants to receive feedback and reduce potential misinterpretation (Harper & Cole, 
2012).  Similar to Wang et al. (2014), each participant had the opportunity to review the 
interview transcript to ensure no data was taken out of context and all interpretation of 
statement was accurate. 
In addition to the interviews, data collection from public records, including annual 
reports, quarterly reports, press releases, audit reports, and financial statements, added to 
the data analysis.  The final source of data was internal documents, requested from 
company officials, such as audit engagement letters, internal financial reports, 
communications between the company and auditors. Using sources to supplement 
interviews in a case study adds depth and texture to the analysis and findings. 
64 
 
Data Collection Technique 
The first collection step I took was researching the company’s financial 
statements, press releases, and any other public documents that may have provided 
insight or context to participants’ responses. Gaining an understanding of the subject 
matter prior to initiating interviews is a strategy supported by Aastrup and Halldorsson 
(2003).  Having a background of the company and knowledge of the historic data allowed 
me to better engage the participants and be prepared with follow-up questions.  
Background knowledge allows an interviewer to identify times when an interviewee may 
be fabricating or guessing an answer they are unsure of (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & 
Podsakoff, 2012). 
The next step was conducting the interviews using open-ended questions.  Open-
ended questions allow the participant to answer, in their own words, their perception on 
the topic (Diefenbach, 2009).  Using short open-ended questions was advantageous 
because this approach mitigated the potential for leading or bias, therefore increasing the 
likelihood the participants were giving truthful answers from their own experiences 
(Podsakoff et al., 2012).  Open-ended questions, however, can lead to unconsciously 
biased answers from interviewees due to influence of cultural scripts, dictating the 
appropriate way to respond to a topic (Diefenbach, 2009). 
Resembling studies by Alfonso et al. (2012) and Agustinus (2013), in-depth 
interviews were the primary means of data collection.  The interviews were at the 
company location.  Each interview opened with a brief introduction and statement about 
the purpose of the study and the participant’s role in the study.  I recorded each interview 
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for accuracy, with the participant’s permission, and notes were taken during the 
interview.  Audio notes, created after each interview, emphasized certain points or factors 
for review in the analysis stages.  Member checking verified the interpretation of the 
interview data from the participants.  This was done after the completion of interviews 
but before the analysis process. 
Data Organization Technique 
I created electronic summary transcriptions of each interview, similar to a study 
by Covell, Sidani, and Ritchie (2012).  Such transcriptions were in Microsoft Excel, 
adding in notes taken during or after the interview and isolating key terms and concepts.  
I met with the interviewees to review the transcription to ensure accuracy of concepts 
provided in the interview and interpretations of the narrative.  Secondary data collected 
from public sources and saved for reference and other documents, requested from the 
company to substantiate the interview responses, provided triangulation to the data. 
Triangulation is accomplished through one of four methods (Yin, 2013).   The use of data 
sources is data triangulation, the use of different evaluators is investigator triangulation, 
the use of multiple perspectives of the same data is theory triangulation, and the use of 
methods is called methodological triangulation.  Bekhet and Zauszniewski (2012) defined 
methodological triangulation as the use of multiple sources or methods to verify 
information is correct, reducing the weakness of a single source.  I used methodological 
triangulation for this study, utilizing semistructured interviews, public company 
documents, and internal documents supplied by the company.  Data triangulation 
provides validity to research findings (Barusch, Gringeri, & George, 2011). 
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I created an Excel spreadsheet tracking the recurring themes of the transcriptions, 
notes, and secondary source data to track the commonality and prevalence of each theme.  
I reviewed each source cyclically to extract common themes, until all repetitive concepts 
are noted and accounted for in the spreadsheet.  Data is securely maintained for a 5-year 
period before destruction. 
Data Analysis 
The use of semistructured interviews allows for follow-up questions and adjusting 
the interview according to the data provided by the interviewee (Rowley, 2012).  The 
interview questions used for this study, in order to answer the overarching question of 
what strategies client managers and boards can use to facilitate an engagement, provide 
relevant evidence, and support management assertions, are as follows: 
1. What interactions exist in the audit process between the client and auditor? 
2. What role does the client play in the audit process?  
3. How does the client’s interaction with the auditor affect audit quality? 
4. What components of the audit process are within the control of the client? 
5. What components of an audit are not within the control of the client? 
6. What measures are appropriate in determining the quality of an audit? 
7. What factors do you believe compromise the quality of the audit process? 
Upon completing the interviews and collecting the data from public records to 
establish methodological triangulation, all information was entered in a singular database 
of an Excel spreadsheet.  Excel tabulated the data entered and allowed for easy 
conversion to charts and tables for presentation.  The database contained all of the themes 
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and concepts presented in the interviews or found in secondary sources.  Counting the 
occurrences of a given theme established the prevalence of that given theme, confirming 
its relevance (Houghton et al., 2013).  Comparison of the research study themes to the 
themes found in the literature review provides peer-review support for the individual 
findings of the study (Houghton et al., 2013).  I added the narratives to the database 
connecting the themes and highlighting key findings.  Rowley (2012) advocated this 
approach to data analysis stressing organizing the data, getting acquainted with the data, 
then classifying, coding, and interpreting the data, finally leading to presenting the data.  I 
created a summary of findings to share with participants and community stakeholders 
who inquire about the results of the study, when providing access the complete study is 
not feasible. 
Reliability and Validity 
Reliability 
Reliability is the consistency with which a study instrument yields repeatable 
results establishing stability (Fan, 2013).  The primary method of reliability and 
credibility assurance for this study was member checking of data interpretation.  Upon 
compiling all of the data from the interviews, a thematic review occurred (Rocha Pereira, 
2012).  To assure no concept or verbiage was taken out of context; the interview 
participants had the opportunity to review my interpretation of their statements.  This 
mitigated any chance of error in the interpretation of the responses and assured that the 
data was accurate.  Member checking was also used to enhance dependability of the 
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study (Anderson, 2010).  Ensuring no application of bias or interpretation to the data 
analysis yielded accurate and repeatable results. 
Qualitative studies focus on the range and representation of the opinions and 
issues, providing rich data (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012).  Interviews continued until the 
study reached saturation.  Saturation occurred when the participants offered no new ideas 
or emergent patterns (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012).  Using a census sample helped to 
enhance saturation by including all parties involved in the audit process, ensuring all 
points of view are covered.  Member checking and methodological triangulation also 
enhanced saturation and verified the data collected, providing credibility. 
Validity 
Validity refers to the alignment of the objective of the study and the research of 
the study, essentially questioning, “Did the study the study examine what it intended to?” 
(Drost, 2011).  The primary issues for the validity of a study are transferability and 
confirmability (Aastrup & Halldorsson, 2003).  Additionally, member checking of data 
interpretation enhances the validity of the analysis.  Transferability refers to the ability to 
apply the findings of a study to other studies given similar circumstances and subject 
matter (Houghton et al., 2013).  This study will be transferable to future studies by 
identifying trends within the findings.  These trends can be tested on a broader or 
different population examining the applicability of the findings of this study elsewhere.  
This study also used multiple sources of data, company employees, audit employees, and 
public financial data to establish methodological triangulation of data to establish 
confirmability (Barusch et al., 2011).   
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Face validity refers to a superficial review of the reasonableness of the study 
(Drost, 2011).  I applied this method in my study in the form of reviewing the interview 
questions and overall goals of the study to ensure alignment.  Review of the questions 
occurred individually, in groups, and as a whole to ensure alignment and consistency. 
Transition and Summary 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to determine what 
strategies client managers and boards can use to facilitate an engagement with an audit 
firm and effectively carry out their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence 
and support for their management assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  This 
section included (a) the role of the researcher, (b) participants, (c) further justify the 
research method and design, (d) participants, (e) data collection and analysis, and (f) 
reliability and validity.  In the next section, I provide (a) the findings of the research, (b) 
application to professional practices, (c) recommendations for action, and (d) 
recommendations for future research. 
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to determine what 
strategies client managers and boards can use to facilitate an engagement with an audit 
firm and effectively carry out their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence 
and support for their management assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  I 
collected data through review of the company’s financial statements, press releases, and 
any other public documents that may provide insight or context to participants’ responses 
and semistructured interviews.  In Section 3, I provide (a) a presentation of the findings 
of the study, (b) applications to professional practice, (c) implications for social change, 
(d) recommendations for action, (e) recommendations for further research, and (f) 
summarize the conclusions of the study. 
Overview of the Study 
I conducted a qualitative exploratory case study to determine what strategies 
client managers and boards can use to facilitate an engagement with an audit firm and 
effectively carry out their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence and 
support for their management assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  I collected 
data through review of the company’s financial statements, press releases, and any other 
public documents that may provide insight or context to participants’ responses and 
semistructured interviews.  I used census sampling, targeting all appropriate individuals 
made available by the target company, with a base knowledge required to adequately 
answer the interview questions in order to acquire the required data from the interviews.  
After completing the interviews I converted the interview recordings to text and analyzed 
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in Microsoft Excel.  Member checking enhanced the accuracy of interpretations of the 
information provided by the interviewees.  After analyzing the data, five themes 
emerged, including (a) communication, (b) documentation, (c) knowledge/experience, (d) 
character, and (e) procedural.  
Presentation of the Findings 
The overarching research question was: What strategies can client managers and 
boards use to facilitate an engagement, provide relevant evidence, and support 
management assertions?  I conducted nine interviews with two client executives, three 
members of client management, and two members of the client’s staff, as well as the 
audit firm’s partner and manager.  One of the client executives was previously an auditor 
for 8 years, and has been involved with audits from the client perspective for 23 years, 
providing insight from both perspectives.  The other executive has been involved in 
audits at various levels of involvement for approximately 20 years.  The three managers 
have been involved with audits, supplying documentation and assisting with data 
collection and validation for 6, 9, and 22 years.  The two staff members who participated 
have been involved in the audit process for 16 and 21 years, ranging from liaising, to 
reconciling documents, and supplying data.  The audit partner has been involved in audits 
for 30 years and the audit manager has been doing audits for over 10 years.  The 
participants in the study are weighted more to the client side, because the focus of the 
study is strategies client managers and boards can use, but the wealth of audit process 
knowledge the audit team possesses could not be ignored in the data collection process. 
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The conceptual framework for this study was agency theory.  I identified 
alignment between my research and the primary tenets of agency theory.  The authors of 
agency theory articulated a belief that management agents will not act in the best interest 
of the principals without proper oversight to ensure such commitment (Jensen & 
Meckling, 2009).  Several themes that emerged during my data analysis align with this 
opinion.  Character, one of the themes, aligns because management with strong character 
and ethical behavior would act in the best interest of the principals inherently.  Procedural 
issues or considerations align with the proper oversight discussed in agency theory.  
Communication is imperative to the relationship between principals and agents. 
Following is a list of the interview questions and themes that emerged from each 
question, starting with the most prevalent theme for each question, then an analysis of the 
themes. 
1. What interactions exist in the audit process between the client and auditor? 
Communication, Knowledge/Experience, Documentation, Procedural 
2. What role does the client play in the audit process?  
Procedural, Documentation, Communication 
3. How does the client’s interaction with the auditor affect audit quality? 
Procedural, Communication, Character, Knowledge/Experience 
4. What components of the audit process are within the control of the client? 
Procedural, Documentation, Character 
5. What components of an audit are not within the control of the client? 
Procedural, Documentation, Knowledge/Experience 
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6. What measures are appropriate in determining the quality of an audit? 
Procedural, Documentation, Communication 
7. What factors do you believe compromise the quality of the audit process? 
Procedural, Character, Documentation, Knowledge/Experience 
Theme 1: Communication 
 The participants emphasized communication in several different forms.  Written 
communication, in hard copy and electronic formats, as well as verbal communication, 
were prominent in the responses.  The aspect of communication was most prevalent in 
the question regarding interactions, but presented in four interview questions during 
analysis.  This communication exists throughout the audit process, according to the 
participants.  Participant 2 and 8 indicated that, initially, the client and firm discuss the 
terms of the engagement, fees, scope, exposure, deadlines, and obligations.  As the audit 
commences, the firm and client must continue open communication to identify any 
operational, regulatory, or accounting changes, including any new pronouncements from 
regulatory agencies. 
 During my research, I found that the target company had a financial restatement 
of one of its prior fiscal years.  I discovered that the company had this restatement due to 
a change in accounting methodology that was communicated to the audit firm, not due to 
any negligence on the part of the audit firm or fraud by the client.  Participant 2 indicated 
that a restatement is not inherently indicative of a low quality audit and that the reason for 
the restatement must be determined in all cases. 
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This theme confirms the statements and findings of several sources throughout the 
literature review.  Communication as a major theme conforms to the views of the 
PCAOB (2015), who identified communication a key audit quality indicator.  Butcher et 
al. (2013) found that communication was a key subcomponent of perceived 
responsiveness, which often factored into a client’s decision of whether or not to retain an 
audit firm.  Communication is a fundamental benefit of internal audit as a component of 
corporate governance (Badea et al., 2014).  Internal audit inproved risk mitigation 
communication and increase audit firm communication.  The component of 
communication from the literature review was from Oi Lin (2014) who found that SOX 
increased the comprehensibility and truthfulness in the discussion of the company’s 
operations. 
Theme 2: Documentation 
 The next theme, documentation, presented in six out of seven interview questions 
during analysis.  Every participant indicated that supplying documents was the client’s 
most frequent task during an audit.  This ranges from supplying reconciliations of general 
ledger accounts to granting access to electronic accounts to supplying the financial 
statements.  The audit firm may make numerous requests for documents and support 
during the audit, which the client must provide.  The client is also responsible for 
maintaining their records and transaction history.  Participants 1 and 4 indicated that 
direct access to records, supplying documents, accuracy of records, and record 
verification improve audit quality, while inaccurate and incomplete records hinder audit 
quality. 
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 A common topic within the theme of documentation was the financial statements, 
as voiced by Participants 2, 4, 8, and 9. According to Participants 2, 8, and 9 financial 
statement accuracy is important because there are many users of these statements, 
including investors, managers, board members, and other stakeholders.  Participants 2 
and 4 indicated that clients must create and provide a fundamental summary of the 
financial statements, trends should be visible throughout, and the statements should be 
neither too aggressive nor too conservative.  Further, Participant 2 indicated that the 
client’s financial statements should include complete, appropriate, and accurate 
disclosures using concise language that reveals any nuances of accounting. 
 The theme of documentation was pervasive throughout the literature review in 
several formats.  Fiolleau et al. (2013) indicated that clients would not supply 
documentation if the auditor did not make a request for the document.  Many studies 
presented in the literature review focused on the financial statements.  The focus of 
studies included:  
• The relationship between aggressive financial statements and governance 
mechanisms (Abdel-Meguid et al., 2013). 
• How internal audits can improve the accuracy of reporting and disclosures in the 
financial statements (Badea et al., 2014; Issa & Kogan, 2014). 
•  Involvement of the audit committee and financial statement quality (Ghafran, & 
O'Sullivan, 2013). 
•  The effect of board structure and independence on financial statements (García-
Sánchez et al., 2012; Ramanan, 2014; Skëndaj et al., 2014). 
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• Manipulation of financial statements to receive higher compensation (Saltaji, 
2013). 
• Auditor size and financial statement conformance to regulations (Ebrahim, 2014. 
• The effect of audit partner rotation of financial statements (Daugherty et al., 
2012).  
The inclusion of this theme aligns with the literature review. 
Theme 3: Knowledge and Experience 
The third theme found during analysis of the research data was the knowledge and 
experience of both the audit firm staff and client management.  Bills, Jeter, and Stein 
(2015) indicated that industry specialization of the audit firm reduces audit costs without 
sacrificing audit quality.  According to Participant 3, the client may be required to 
educate the audit firm staff about their product and industry in order to make the firm’s 
review more targeted to the important topics.  Knowledge of the client’s industry and 
agencies that regulate the business by the audit firm staff and client management is very 
important to a quality audit.  Bin, Lennox, and Qingquan (2015) found that audit firms 
could delegate less experienced partners to accounts that are not viewed as priority.   
The target company withdrew as an SEC registrant subsequent to the release of 
the SOX regulations.  During my research, I found that the company withdrew due to the 
lack of knowledge of their audit firm pertaining to the definitions of key terms used by 
the SOX regulation authors.  The company was unwilling to attest lawfully to terms that 
could not be concisely defined. 
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Similar to the previous themes, knowledge and experience were common topics 
throughout the literature review.  Ramanan (2014) indicated that accurate statements 
produced by a more intimate knowledge of the company’s operations and results.  The 
PCAOB (2015) focused on several characteristics of the audit firm that were key audit 
quality indicators, particularly specialized skills and knowledge, experience, and industry 
knowledge.  Daugherty et al. (2012) analyzed direct and indirect effects of audit partner 
retention, including increased client specific knowledge.  Johnstone et al. (2014) 
conducted a study specific to audit fess and quality, determining that client specific 
knowledge influence both.  Litt et al. (2014) found that audit quality was higher in the 2 
years prior to mandatory audit rotation, due in part to the accumulated client knowledge. 
Theme 4: Character 
 The next theme from the research was character.  This theme alludes to the 
personal and professional ethics of the individuals and groups involved in the audit 
process.  Most of the focus of this topic was on the ethics of the client’s management, 
because perception indicates that the client has more to gain from hiding or altering 
records.  Chinniah (2015) discussed the ethics of CFOs, controllers, and accounting staff 
in respect to the accurate recordation of transactions and preparation of the financial 
statements.  Fiolleau et al. (2013) indicated that clients might not provide any documents 
beyond what the auditors request for fear of complicating the process or divulging 
potentially harmful information.  According to Participants 6 and 7, in addition to hiding 
and altering records, client management can use ambiguity in regulations to apply 
discretion and improve the financial results.  Khatri (2015) discussed the concept of 
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“creative accounting” in which management uses the flexibility within regulations and 
accounting principles to manage earnings and presentation. 
 Numerous authors discussed character throughout the literature review.  The 
perception of the benefit client management can gain from hiding these records is higher 
compensation for better results, thus leading to manipulation of financial statements 
(Saltaji, 2013).  Badea et al. (2014) indicated that internal audits can promote ethical 
behavior.  Some participants specifically cited Enron for its documented ethical issues, 
which was supported by Kao et al. (2013).  Another ethics issue identified by the 
partcipants was the client intimidating the audit staff.  Dao et al. (2012) discussed a 
method of intimidation as opinion shopping.  This act threatens the audit firm’s future 
revenue by indicating a willingness to change audit firms to acquire the client’s desired 
audit finding. 
Theme 5: Procedural 
 The final broadest theme was procedural.  The breadth of this theme allowed for 
the identification of several prominent topics.  The topics that group into procedural are 
all of the concepts that pertain to the processes and procedures to conduct the audit, 
including structure and size of the audit firm, regulations, timing and scheduling, 
methodology of testing, and findings.   
Size and structure of the audit firm. Audit firm size and structure was the focus 
of participant discussions during the interview process by Participants 2, 3, and 8, 
indicating that larger firms and smaller firms each have advantages to the client.  
Paunescu (2015) found that audit reports are materially weaker when small audit firms 
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performed the audit, while Bin et al. (2015) indicated that larger firms with larger staffing 
could delegate less experienced partners to certain accounts.  Bills and Cunningham 
(2015) indicated that small firms could join associations to contend with the quality 
offered by larger firms at lower costs. 
My target company used a large international audit firm when it was an SEC 
registrant, but switched to a smaller, regional audit firm once it withdrew from the SEC.  
According to Participant 2, the company indicated that they needed a “name brand” firm 
while they were an SEC registrant.  Once the company withdrew from the SEC, the 
company decided to use a smaller and more cost efficient firm. 
Several researchers within the literature review discussed topic of audit firm size.  
Eshleman and Peng (2014) and Yahn-Shir et al. (2013) found that larger firms, 
specifically Big 4 firms, issued less restatements, indicating higher quality audits.  Gul et 
al., (2013) found that individual auditors with large firm experience provided higher 
quality audits.  Ebrahim (2014) found that internationally affiliated audit firms are more 
likely to ensure their clients’ regulatory compliance than are local firms.   
 Regulations.  Two major subjects emerged from the analysis of the participants’ 
responses regarding regulations: SOX and audit rotation.  Participant 2 mentioned SOX 
because it added resource usage for both the audit firm and client.  The participants also 
stated that SOX transitioned the focus of the audit to testing assertions, rather than a 
collaborative effort to create the most accurate financial statements.  
 Numerous researchers in the literature review supported the inclusion of SOX as 
well.  Abdel-Meguid et al. (2013) and Kao et al. (2013) tested to determine if SOX 
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improved audit quality.  Erickson et al. (2014) discussed the specific section of SOX 404, 
which requires a company to disclose an assessment of the company’s internal controls 
over financial reporting as well as the audit firm’s assessment of such controls, while 
Shaw and Terando (2014) discussed the excessive cost of compliance to this section 
alone.  SOX established the partner tenure rules and cool down periods in effect in the 
United States (Litt et al., 2014). 
 The second topic that the participants discussed within regulations was auditor 
rotation, indicating that perception of firm rotation is increased audit quality.  My 
research of the company found that in the 10 years preceding the study, the company had 
a firm rotation and a partner rotation.  Bowlin, Hobson, and Piercey (2015) determined 
that the auditor’s mindset influences the effect of auditor rotation.  If the auditor 
approaches the audit skeptical of management’s assertions, the audit quality is higher 
without rotating, while an auditor assuming honesty improves audit quality when a 
rotation occurs. 
 Many researchers in the literature review discussed auditor rotation, specifically 
separating partner rotation and firm rotation.  Daugherty et al. (2012) found that longer 
audit partner tenure contributed to quality and client knowledge.  Alternatively, those 
surveyed indicated that rotation contributes to independence, in fact and perception.  
Azizkhani et al. (2013) concluded that partner rotation results in higher ex-ante costs and 
diminishes audit quality. 
Anis (2014) found that auditors believe mandatory auditor rotation will increase 
audit quality.  The researcher also found that auditors indicated an average tenure 
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requirement of 3.8 years to establish acceptable audit quality and the perception of 
auditor rotation increases auditor independence, but at the cost of client specific 
knowledge.  Inversely, researchers in Spain found that audit quality does not increase 
with longer audit tenure (Blandon & Argiles Bosch, 2013). 
Timing and scheduling. The participants discussed several aspects of timing and 
scheduling that have an effect on the audit.  Such aspects included meeting deadlines, 
time constraints, preparation, and audit within the budget as voiced by participants 3, 4, 
6, and 7.  The client company has a set deadline by which it must file its financial 
statements and complete the audit.  Many auditors work on more than one client at a 
time, creating time constraints on their work.  The audit requires preparation by both the 
client and the audit firm in order the audit to be completed.  Finally, both the audit firm 
and the client have a budget for the audit to adhere to and monitor during the process. 
Author cited in the literature review discussed the impact of auditor time 
constraints and budget considerations.  The PCAOB (2015) identified workload as one of 
its key audit quality indicators.  Lopez and Peter (2012) also supported this theory, who 
found that higher workload negatively influences audit quality.   
Hackenbrack et al. (2014) found that timing of audit fee disclosure has an effect 
on company performance, thus audit fee reporting lag is detrimental to investor 
knowledge and decision-making.  Cahan and Sun (2015) and Johnstone (2014) found that 
audit fees positively relate to audit quality.  This is due to higher work and attention 
dedicated to the client, constituting a higher fee and resulting in higher quality.  This is, 
however, in opposition to the prior topic of time constraints.  Audit firms cannot dedicate 
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sufficient manpower or qualified partners to every client’s audit.  Clients also cannot 
have the audit timeframe increase to the aforementioned deadline for filing. 
 Methodology of testing. Several subjects pertaining to methodology of testing 
that participants mentioned were sampling, extent and structure of testing, consistency, 
processes and controls tested, and materiality.  Participants 3 and 4 mentioned sampling 
as an audit method that can be misleading.  Christensen, Elder, and Glover (2015) found 
that audit firms use different methods to drive sampling, resulting in different sample 
sizes for testing.  Skëndaj et al. (2014) also discussed the concept of improper financial 
statement testing.  Thus, the extent and structure of the testing can vary and be 
inconsistent.  Participants 3, 4, and 9 also mentioned the need for testing of processes and 
controls.  As mentioned previously, researchers in the literature review found SOX 
section 404 focused on this topic, but is very costly (Shaw & Terando, 2014).  A 
significant topic from the literature mentioned by participant 8 was materiality.  
Throughout the literature, numerous researchers and authors discussed material errors 
(Liu et al., 2012), misstatements (Knechel et al., 2013; Ojo, 2014), aggressive financial 
statements (Abdel-Meguid et al., 2013), material mistakes (Skinner & Srinivasan, 2012), 
material non-compliances (Cullinan & Rohland, 2014), and material accuracy (Kleinman 
et al., 2014).  The term material misstatements collectively identifies all of these 
concepts.  The foundation of this term hinders on the establishment of materiality, in 
order to determine if a material misstatement has occurred, as defined by GAO (2003). 
 Findings. Participants 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 identified several topics pertaining to audit 
findings.  For example, the auditor identifies areas of concern and outstanding issues, 
83 
 
considers required adjustments and the complexity of judgment used by management in 
the financial statements, and ensures that management addressed issues identified in prior 
audits. 
Participant 8 discussed complexity of judgment as an aspect that could 
compromise audit quality.  The target company states in its financial disclosures that the 
use of estimates is required.  Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous (2015) stated that 
valuation allowances and impairments have become a critical aspect of financial 
statements, while the difficulty of establishing fair market value increases persistently.  
Many of the concepts reported by the participants are present throughout the literature 
review as well.  Particularly, the reporting of issues (Franzel, 2014; Saltaji, 2013), 
compliance (Wedemeyer, 2014), and judgment, frequently in the form of discretionary 
accruals (Cahan & Sun, 2015; Elshafie & Nyadroh, 2014; Yu-Ting et al., 2014) all 
existed in the literature review. 
Applications to Professional Practice 
The success of every business hinges on its ability to implement sound business 
practices (Florea, Cheung, & Herndon, 2013).  During the research, data collection, and 
data analysis phases of this study I found a significant amount of data pertaining to the 
quality of an audit.  The findings of this study show the key areas where business 
professionals believe there are gaps in the current audit processes that could lead to low 
quality audits.  The audit process is a procedural occurrence between two companies to 
satisfy a regulatory requirement, so it is not surprising that numerous aspects of process 
and procure were the focus of participants’ comments. 
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The value of this study is primarily in the different approach of the study and 
secondarily in the consolidation and synthesis of data.  Audit quality is the subject of 
numerous studies, but primarily from the standpoint of the auditor or the audit industry.  
This study focused on the client’s perspective of the audit and the viewpoints the client 
has on how to improve audit quality.  When all of the studies that exist are from the 
perspective of one party, it becomes commonplace to believe that perspective is 
universal.  All of the studies taking the auditor’s perspective reflect that the client is 
responsible for the data, the reports, and the regulatory concerns.  The findings of this 
study show that the client company believes the relationship should be more 
collaborative.  The secondary benefit of this study was the consolidation and synthesis of 
data.  Of the many studies on the topic of audit quality, many accounted for a few aspects 
discussed in this study, but none discussed all of the aspects included in this study.  This 
study consolidates all of the popular concepts from audit quality and synthesizes them 
into a cohesive view, in an attempt to capture a full picture of the concepts affecting audit 
quality.  Business practice improves with greater knowledge and a more holistic 
viewpoint of the problem. 
Implications for Social Change 
The findings of this study can promote social change by enhancing knowledge of 
what role management can play in ensuring a high-quality audit.  The consideration of 
the themes found in this study could help to identify improved standards to ensure higher 
audit quality and improve stakeholder confidence in the financial statements of 
companies.  This increased confidence can help to ease the minds of company 
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shareholders, company employees, and ownership.  Addressing the fundamentals of 
building a quality audit process will help to restore the confidence of the public in the 
way companies are managed, disproving that SOX was implemented too quickly and 
without research (Gupta et al., 2013).  Additionally, the implementation of a quality audit 
process ensures the elimination of collusion between auditors and clients, adding to the 
confidence of investors and thereby contributing to social change. 
Recommendations for Action 
My observations confirm there is an existing gap between the client management 
and audit firms on to best promote audit quality.  The recommendations that I offer from 
reviewing the results of this study derive primarily from the procedural, communication, 
and knowledge and experience components of the findings.  Client management should 
conduct greater due diligence when researching an audit firm to potentially conduct its 
financial and operational audit.  Management should determine if the firm has experience 
with the company’s product and industry.  Requesting references from the firm to 
confirm such knowledge and establish a history should be part of this research process.  
The client management should establish an open dialogue with the audit firm and 
communicate all issues as they occur throughout the year.  Such communication will 
make the audit smoother and reduce workload during the audit period.  Client 
management should be forthcoming with all information, with the objective of 
collaboratively creating financial statements that accurate reflect the position and future 
of the business.  I also recommend that client management be educated on the regulatory 
bodies that govern the business and industry.  This will allow management to guide the 
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audit firm to the most important aspects of the business, not spending the limited 
available time on trivial research and documentation. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
The primary recommendation for further research would be to conduct a similar 
study on a larger company.  While the target company of this study experienced many of 
the issues identified in the literature as issues associated with audit quality, much more 
information may come from a larger company.  The company has changed firm sizes, 
from a Big 4 to a smaller, regional firm; had a restatement; deregistered from the SEC; 
rotated audit partners; and rotated audit firms.  I used census sampling for this study and 
interviewed all individuals involved with the audit on the client’s side and the audit 
partner and manager on the audit side.  Using a larger company would garner more 
individuals for participation in the study and potentially provide insight to a more defined 
finding.   
I limited my research to a case study of a single Connecticut-based organization.  
A single case study limits the amount of data a researcher collects (Yin, 2014).  Included 
in the limitations of my study results is participants may not have expressed comments 
reflecting best practices.  While I took steps to eliminate my bias, the results may not be 
totally bias free.  Using a larger company can expand the participant pool, but would not 
necessarily make the participants more knowledgeable or able to better recollect prior 
issues.  A larger company would have more records to review for historic information, 
but feasibility of full review is lower.  Lastly, while a researcher without direct 
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knowledge of the may be bias free, the researcher may not be able to interpret the 
collected data.  
Reflections 
I believe that a comprehensive, independent audit is the only true test of a 
company’s statement of financial position.  It is important to note that I believe the client 
is just as interested in a quality audit as the audit firm is.  The company’s agents have an 
obligation to function in the best interest of the principals at all times. The audit is the 
only tool available to determine whether this is truly occurring.  I have worked for several 
companies and involved in many audits.  Thus, I could talk endlessly about the audit 
process, the pitfalls that companies run into with ethical issues, and the inherent issues of 
audits.  As that list would indicate, I was predisposed to speak primarily about issues 
negatively associated with companies and why audits are critical.  Conducting this study 
from the viewpoint of “how can we improve audit,” rather than my natural inclination of 
“why audits will never truly work” has been beneficial.  The participants of the study 
showed an extensive knowledge on the subject and covered many topics I was hoping to 
hear about.  I found myself smiling several times when I heard a participant bring up a 
subject I had hoped would be discussed.  My interactions with the participants were 
insightful, enjoyable, and satisfying; as was my time on this study and the DBA Doctoral 
Study as a whole. 
Conclusion 
Companies control the wellbeing of numerous individuals, including employees, 
managers, owners, stockholders, and board members.  In order to safeguard the well-
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being of all of these individuals, controls must be in place to ensure the company operates 
in the best interest of everyone.  Financial statement audits are the primary safeguard 
these individuals have to ensure the company reports its financial position fairly and free 
of material misstatements.  In order to ensure the audit functions optimally, the 
company’s management can implement strategies to facilitate an engagement, provide 
relevant evidence, and support management assertions.  The emergent themes of my 
doctoral study include strategies a client firm can implement to enhance the quality of the 
external audit results. 
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Appendix A: Data Use Agreement 
DATA USE AGREEMENT 
 
 
This Data Use Agreement (“Agreement”), effective as of (Date) (“Effective Date”), is 
entered into by and between Christopher Turner (“Data Recipient”) and (Company) 
(“Data Provider”).  The purpose of this Agreement is to provide Data Recipient with 
access to a Limited Data Set (“LDS”) for use in research in accord with laws and 
regulations of the governing bodies associated with the Data Provider, Data 
Recipient, and Data Recipient’s educational program. In the case of a discrepancy 
among laws, the agreement shall follow whichever law is more strict.   
 
Definitions.  Due to the study’s affiliation with Laureate, a USA-based company, unless 
otherwise specified in this Agreement, all capitalized terms used in this Agreement not 
otherwise defined have the meaning established for purposes of the USA “HIPAA 
Regulations” and/or “FERPA Regulations” codified in the United States Code of Federal 
Regulations, as amended from time to time. 
Preparation of the LDS.  Data Provider shall prepare and furnish to Data Recipient a LDS 
in accord with any applicable laws and regulations of the governing bodies associated 
with the Data Provider, Data Recipient, and Data Recipient’s educational program. 
Data Fields in the LDS.  No direct identifiers such as names may be included in the 
Limited Data Set (LDS). In preparing the LDS, Data Provider shall include the data 
fields specified as follows, which are the minimum necessary to accomplish the research:  
Availability, at the Data Provider’s convenience, to employees for interviewing, access to 
financial statements and audits . 
Responsibilities of Data Recipient.  Data Recipient agrees to: 
Use or disclose the LDS only as permitted by this Agreement or as required by law; 
Use appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the LDS other than as 
permitted by this Agreement or required by law; 
Report to Data Provider any use or disclosure of the LDS of which it becomes aware that 
is not permitted by this Agreement or required by law; 
Require any of its subcontractors or agents that receive or have access to the LDS to 
agree to the same restrictions and conditions on the use and/or disclosure of the LDS that 
apply to Data Recipient under this Agreement; and 
Not use the information in the LDS to identify or contact the individuals who are data 
subjects.  
Permitted Uses and Disclosures of the LDS.  Data Recipient may use and/or disclose the 
LDS for its Research activities only.   
Term and Termination. 
Term.  The term of this Agreement shall commence as of the Effective Date and shall 
continue for so long as Data Recipient retains the LDS, unless sooner terminated as set 
forth in this Agreement. 
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Termination by Data Recipient.  Data Recipient may terminate this agreement at any time 
by notifying the Data Provider and returning or destroying the LDS.   
Termination by Data Provider.  Data Provider may terminate this agreement at any time 
by providing thirty (30) days prior written notice to Data Recipient.   
For Breach.  Data Provider shall provide written notice to Data Recipient within ten (10) 
days of any determination that Data Recipient has breached a material term of this 
Agreement.  Data Provider shall afford Data Recipient an opportunity to cure said alleged 
material breach upon mutually agreeable terms.  Failure to agree on mutually agreeable 
terms for cure within thirty (30) days shall be grounds for the immediate termination of 
this Agreement by Data Provider. 
Effect of Termination.  Sections 1, 4, 5, 6(e) and 7 of this Agreement shall survive any 
termination of this Agreement under subsections c or d.   
Miscellaneous. 
Change in Law.  The parties agree to negotiate in good faith to amend this Agreement to 
comport with changes in federal law that materially alter either or both parties’ 
obligations under this Agreement.  Provided however, that if the parties are unable to 
agree to mutually acceptable amendment(s) by the compliance date of the change in 
applicable law or regulations, either Party may terminate this Agreement as provided in 
section 6. 
Construction of Terms.  The terms of this Agreement shall be construed to give effect to 
applicable federal interpretative guidance regarding the HIPAA Regulations. 
No Third Party Beneficiaries.  Nothing in this Agreement shall confer upon any person 
other than the parties and their respective successors or assigns, any rights, remedies, 
obligations, or liabilities whatsoever. 
Counterparts.  This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of 
which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the 
same instrument. 
Headings.  The headings and other captions in this Agreement are for convenience and 
reference only and shall not be used in interpreting, construing or enforcing any of the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the undersigned has caused this Agreement to be duly 
executed in its name and on its behalf. 
 
 
DATA PROVIDER    DATA RECIPIENT 
 
Signed:                             Signed:       
 
Print Name:        Print Name:       
 
Print Title:        Print Title:       
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Appendix B: Letter of Cooperation from a Research Partner 
 
Letter of Cooperation from a Research Partner 
  
(Company Name and Address) 
 
(Date) 
 
Dear Christopher Turner,  
   
Based on my review of your research proposal, I give permission for you to conduct the 
study entitled “An Examination of Audit Process Inputs and the Effect on Audit Quality” 
within (Company).  As part of this study, I authorize you to interview company 
employees. Individuals’ participation will be voluntary and at their own discretion.  
 
We understand that our organization’s responsibilities include: allowing employees to 
engage in a voluntary interview. We reserve the right to withdraw from the study at any 
time if our circumstances change.  
 
 
I confirm that I am authorized to approve research in this setting and that this plan 
complies with the organization’s policies. 
 
I understand that the data collected will remain entirely confidential and may not be 
provided to anyone outside of the student’s supervising faculty/staff without permission 
from the Walden University IRB.   
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
(Executive), (Title) 
(Company) 
 
Walden University policy on electronic signatures: An electronic signature is just as valid as 
a written signature as long as both parties have agreed to conduct the transaction 
electronically. Electronic signatures are regulated by the Uniform Electronic Transactions 
Act. Electronic signatures are only valid when the signer is either (a) the sender of the email, 
or (b) copied on the email containing the signed document. Legally an "electronic signature" 
can be the person’s typed name, their email address, or any other identifying marker. Walden 
University staff verify any electronic signatures that do not originate from a password-
protected source (i.e., an email address officially on file with Walden). 
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Appendix C: Certificate of Ethical Compliance 
 
 
Certificate of Completion 
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural Research 
certifies that Christopher Turner successfully completed the NIH 
Web-based training course “Protecting Human Research Participants”. 
Date of completion: 05/15/2014 
Certification Number: 1467918 
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Appendix D: Consent Form 
You are invited to take part in a research study of what strategies client managers can 
use to improve audit quality.  The researcher is inviting you to participate in this study because 
the company’s executive team has identified you as a professional with prior experience in 
audit process from the client or auditor side. This form is part of a process called “informed 
consent” to allow you to understand this study before deciding whether to take part. 
 This study is being conducted by a researcher named Christopher Turner, who is a 
doctoral student at Walden University.  You may already know the researcher as a controller, but 
this study is separate from that role. 
Background Information: 
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to determine what strategies 
client managers can use to facilitate an engagement with an audit firm and effectively 
carry out their responsibility to provide effective relevant evidence and support for their 
management assertions as outlined in the engagement letter.  Procedures: 
If you agree to be in this study, you will be asked to:  
• Take part in one approximately 30 minute interview to answer several interview 
questions in your office or a private conference room at your company’s 
headquarters.  
• Take part in one approximately 5 minute follow-up meeting to verify the interview 
transcript and interpretation in your office or a private conference room at your 
company’s headquarters. 
Here are some sample questions: 
1. What interactions exist in the audit process between the client and auditor? 
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2. What role does the client play in the audit process?  
3. How does the client’s interaction with the auditor affect audit quality? 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: 
This study is voluntary. Everyone will respect your decision of whether or not you choose to be in 
the study. If you decide to join the study now, you can still change your mind later. You may stop 
at any time without fear of adverse effects, personally or professionally.  
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: 
There are no known risks for participating in this study. If you are uncomfortable 
responding to some of the questions, please inform me and we can either stop the 
interview or skip a question.  Being in this study would not pose risk to your safety or 
wellbeing.  
While there are no direct benefits to participants, your participation will provide insight to the 
researcher regarding what client managers can control in their interaction with the auditor 
to affect the quality of the financial statement audit. 
Payment: 
Participants will not be awarded gifts, compensation, or paid to participate in the study. 
Privacy: 
Any information you provide will be kept confidential.  The researcher will not use your personal 
information for any purposes outside of this research project. Also, the researcher will not include 
your name or anything else that could identify you in the study reports. Data will be kept secure 
by issuing participants an identification number by which each participant will be referred.  Data 
will be kept for a period of 5 years, as required by the university. 
Contacts and Questions: 
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You may ask any questions you have now.  Or, if you have questions later, you may contact the 
researcher via email at christopher.turner@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about your 
rights as a participant, you can call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden University 
representative who can discuss this with you. Her phone number is 1-800-925-3368 ext. 312-
1210. She can be reach by email at irb@waldenu.edu.  Walden University’s approval number for 
this study is 03-28-16-0290102 and it expires on March 27, 2017. 
The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep.  
Statement of Consent: 
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a 
decision about my involvement. By signing below, I understand that I am agreeing to the terms 
described above. 
 
  
Printed Name of Participant  
Date of consent  
Participant’s Signature  
Researcher’s Signature  
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Appendix E: Interview Protocol 
1. The participant was asked to review the consent form and ask questions prior to 
signing.   
2. The participant was given a copy of the consent form and be reminded that 
participation was voluntary and could be withdrawn at any time.   
3. The interviewee was notified that the interview would be recorded and notes 
would be taken.   
4. The duration of the interview was approximately 30 minutes, addressing the seven 
interview questions and relevant follow-up questions.   
5. A follow-up 5 minute meeting was made with the participant to review the 
interview transcription for accuracy and completeness.  
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Appendix F: Interview Questions 
8. What interactions exist in the audit process between the client and auditor? 
9. What role does the client play in the audit process?  
10. How does the client’s interaction with the auditor affect audit quality? 
11. What components of the audit process are within the control of the client? 
12. What components of an audit are not within the control of the client? 
13. What measures are appropriate in determining the quality of an audit? 
14. What factors do you believe compromise the quality of the audit process? 
 
 
